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DAVID GAPPA: Good afternoon. I would like to welcome all of you
here to the University of Georgia School of Law. On behalf of the
Georgia Society of International and Comparative Law it is a great
pleasure to be able to open this conference this afternoon. I would
like to make several acknowledgements. First, this conference is pos-
sible because of funding that we have received from the Ford Foun-
dation. Secondly, it was due to great efforts from both Professor
Wilner and Professor Sohn who helped us initially in formulating the
focus of this conference. And four students in particular: Bill Roebuck,
Christopher Sabec, Michael Thomerson, and Alan Creighton. They
put a great deal of time and effort into this and I would like to
thank them and all of the other students and members of the Society
who helped out to make this conference possible. We are going to
have presentations from the first panelists now and Professor Wilner,
who is the advisor of the Georgia Society of International and Com-
parative Law will be moderating the panels. We will be starting with
Mr. Rusk. At this time I would like to turn the program over to
Professor Wilner.
PROFESSOR WILNER: Thank you very much Mr. Gappa. My role
this afternoon will be that of introducing one great expert after the
other. I want to begin by thanking Mr. Gappa and his colleagues for
this conference. It is they who have been the heart and soul of this
and who ought to receive the credit for the excellent organization,
their steadfastness in insisting that the participants come to Athens,
and that they have arrived. The efficiency with which they have put
everything together has made it so easy for us. The idea of the
conference was not merely to talk about one specific problem, although
that problem as a case example is certainly timely, namely the crisis
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in the Persian Gulf-but to talk in more general terms of the manner
in which the United Nations deals with the problem of aggression
and the necessary use of force to deal With that sort of problem. We
have of course expanded that to look at the powers of the various
organs of the United Nations beyond the use of force merely in
response to aggression. You will see that unfolding as the meeting
continues.
Now, it is my great honor to introduce a colleague whom it has
been my privilege to follow over a long number of years here at the
University of Georgia Law School. He is an inspiration for all of us
and has been the single factor of greatest importance in making our
international law program viable here at the University of Georgia.
Professor Dean Rusk is the Samuel H. Sibley Professor of Inter-
national Law. He has in the past held very high offices. Obviously
we know about his most distinguished career from the books that
have been published about him recently. He was Secretary of State
for eight years and before that had a distinguished public career. We
are very fortunate to have Professor Rusk give us his wisdom on the
very basic issue of the international peace with respect to the inter-
national organization with which he has been connected since its
inception. Professor Rusk -
Introductory Remarks
PROFESSOR RUSK: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Ladies
and Gentlemen. Let me add a personal word of welcome to those of
you who are attending this conference. I shall be very brief.
In January 1947, then Secretary of State George Marshall asked
me to leave the post of Personal Assistant to the Secretary of War
in the Pentagon and cross the Potomac River to assume responsibility
for the United Nations Affairs in the State Department. The office
that was responsible for it was then called Special Political Affairs,
because during the war they wanted some sort of neutral name for
it. It was soon changed to the Bureau of United Nations Affairs. I
was the immediate successor to Alger Hiss and for those of you who
remember the later story of Alger Hiss let me just say that when I
took charge of this office, I had heard rumors in the Pentagon about
Alger Hiss and so I asked the security office of the State Department
to give me a run down on the members of that Bureau-227 of them-
from a security and loyalty point of view. And they all checked out
in tip top shape and no one of them ever got into any difficulty in
that subject later on. So whatever the story of Alger Hiss was, at
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least he did not cram that part of the State Department with ques-
tionable characters. That has always been a matter of interest to me.
My role as director of the Office of the United Nations Affairs
soon became first Assistant Secretary of the United Nations Affairs.
At that time there were three of us-three Assistant Secretaries. Today
there are more than twenty officers of the State Department who
hold the rank or the title of Assistant Secretary of State. There is a
tendency in government for constant inflation of titles. I went to a
meeting in Ardenhouse before I became Secretary of State. The various
characters sat talking about Latin American relations. And they were
very insistent that the Assistant Secretary for Latin America be pro-
moted to Under-Secretary of State for Latin America, to underline
the special significance they attached to relations in this hemisphere.
Well the effect of that would be that every other Assistant Secretary
of State would insist upon becoming an Under-Secretary of State and
there we go. One distinguished retired American diplomat protested
this constant inflation of characters and he pointed out that the term
"Madam" began as a form of address for a queen, and that it has
deteriorated pretty badly since then.
But I was present for the impact of the early stages of the Cold
War on the promises and hopes that were attached to the United
Nations Charter. I think we ought to understand as Americans some-
thing about the origins of the Cold War-not everyone will agree
with me on this. But immediately after V-J Day, the United States
demobilized almost completely and almost overnight. By the summer
of 1946 we did not have in our Army a single division, or in the Air
Force a single wing, that was really ready for combat. The ships of
our Navy were being put into mothballs as fast as we could find
berths for them, and those that remained afloat were being manned
by skeleton crews. Our defense budget for three fiscal years came
down to a little over $11 billion, seeking a target of $10 billion. We
were, in practical effect, disarmed. Well, Joseph Stalin sat over there
in Moscow and looked out across the West and saw the armed forces
melting away. So what did he do? He demanded two eastern provinces
of Turkey. He supported the guerrillas going after Greece. He had
a hand in the Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia. He blockaded
Berlin. He gave the green light to the North Koreans to go after
South Korea. He walked out of the Paris meeting of European gov-
ernments to consider their response to the invitation to the Marshall
Plan. He broke up the negotiations with the United States for a $1
billion loan in the postwar period. In other words, he embarked upon
a series of adventures that literally began the Cold War. The result
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was that he produced the Marshall Plan, he produced NATO, and
he produced the policy of containment. Well, that had an immediate
effect upon the theory of the United Nations Charter, because the
U.N. Charter was based upon the principle that the five permanent
members of Security Council would have to act together if the Security
Council was to perform its primarily function (which was to maintain
international peace and security).
There began a series of Russian vetoes in the Security Council which
paralyzed the Security Council on important matters, and it produced
a good deal of frustration with the United Nations because it could
not live up to the promises of its Charter. There was one incident
previous to the present situation in which the United Nations was
able to act, but that was largely accidental in character, because when
the North Koreans attacked South Korea the Russian representative
had recently walked out of the Security Council over the issue of the
Chinese seat. Well, I asked Ambassador Dobrynin to find out for
me why it was that the Russian Ambassador did not return to the
Security Council in order to veto those resolutions on Korea, and he
went to Moscow on a visit and came back and told me that he had
learned that Joseph Stalin had personally telephoned his representative
at the United Nations and had instructed him not to return to the
Security Council to handle the Korean question.
Now that was done before President Truman made his decision to
introduce American troops. So we don't know what Joseph Stalin
would have done had he made that decision after the American troops
appeared on the battle field. But we have had a long chain of Soviet
vetoes in the Security Council, both on Chapter 6 and Chapter 7
issues.
Chapter 6, you will recall, deals with the peaceful settlement of
disputes and Chapter 7 involves the enforcement powers of the Security
Council. The United States itself had recommended that we eliminate
the veto on the Chapter 6 questions, but the Soviets would have none
of it. I once chided Mr. Gromyko, who at the time was the Soviet
representative at the United Nations, about casting so many vetoes.
And he simply pointed his finger in my face and said, "There will
come a time when you Americans will value the veto as much as we
do." And there was a certain prophetic ring to that as history will
record.
But the Security Council is given by the Charter primary respon-
sibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. The
United States has taken the word "primary" literally and assigns
certain responsibilities to the General Assembly in the event the Se-
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curity Council is unable to act because of a veto. The Soviets have
largely taken the view that the Security Council has the sole respon-
sibility for maintaining international peace and security and that the
General Assembly should not act in the absence of the Security Council
decision. Well, there has been a good deal of controversy over that
but we have seen that the Soviet Union is not really willing to accept
the changes in the Charter except for the membership in the Security
Council, which was moved from eleven to fifteen, and membership
in the Economic and Social Council. Otherwise the Charter is subject
to veto as far as amendment is concerned.
Now look at the present situation, where the Soviet Union and
China joined with Britain, France and the United States in passing
twelve resolutions affecting Kuwait. That was a major event in the
history of the United Nations, the first time since Korea that the
United Nations had been able to act on an issue of aggression. One
would have to say that it became possible because of the personal
policy of Mr. Gorbachev. We have a great stake in the fate of Mr.
Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. He faces very great problems over
there. He has an economic system that is barely working. He has a
military establishment to deal with. He has the problem of the rem-
nants of the Communist party which is deeply entrenched throughout
the country. He has the intrinsical tendencies of the republics of the
Soviet Union to declare their independence or something near inde-
pendence. And so his future is in considerable jeopardy. But we have
a stake in the policies announced by Gorbachev and his Prime Minister
at the United Nations in talking about in effect a new world order.
It may be that if there is a change in the Soviet Union it will be a
reversal of that attempt by Gorbachev and we will return once again
to the impact of the Cold War upon the operations of the United
Nations. I for one hope that that will not occur and that we will be
able to work with the Soviet Union on other issues just as we have
on the Persian Gulf. I have regretted that President Bush did not
take more time to find out whether it was possible to reconcile the
approach of the Soviet Union with the approach of the United States
before we took the last couple of steps. Nevertheless, the Soviet
leadership has apparently responded with a certain maturity of judg-
ment and has not broken off relationships in a heat because of the
differences that emerged between Gorbachev and Bush, although this
relationship has been described as "fragile" by Soviet leaders.
Now, the ability of the Security Council to operate does depend
upon the ability of the five permanent members to agree. The five
permanent members are in effect the five victors of World War II,
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although we would have to say that the status of China and France
as victors of World War II is somewhat shaky, but nevertheless those
five have the veto. The United Nations in the peacekeeping field,
therefore, is dependent upon the ability to obtain agreements among
those five permanent members and it has been very difficult to do
so during this Cold War period. Whether that is changed fundamen-
tally depends upon attitudes in Washington and Moscow. It is a little
premature to say that those changes that have occurred thus far have
been fundamental in character, that they will endure, but we have to
hope that that will be the case.
Now, the United States does not have a clean slate in using the
United Nations. We really messed up the Law of the Sea negotiations,
for example. We denied the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice in the Nicaraguan case. We have done various things during
the Reagan Administration to assure a certain contempt for the United
Nations and international law. But we can repair that very quickly
with a former representative of the United Nations as president. So
my hunch is that the ability of the United Nations to carry out an
effective and functioning peacekeeping role is still up for grabs, it is
still to be determined, and it will be determined largely by agreement
between Washington and Moscow. The uncertainties in both capitols
on that subject will give us a result as to whether the United Nations
Security Council can in fact do the job that it was anticipated in the
Charter that it should do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PANEL I: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS
PROFESSOR WILNER: Thank you very much, Professor Rusk, for
locating the entire set of issues and your perspective.
Our first panel will concentrate on the powers of the political organs
of the United Nations. The first, obviously, in matters of the main-
tenance of peace is the Security Council. And so we will proceed.
Our speaker, who has very kindly come from a very busy schedule
indeed at this time and who has been very kind in leaving New York
when the United Nations Security Council has been so occupied is,
of course, Ambassador Phillippe Kirsch, who is currently the Deputy
Permanent Representative of Canada to the U.N. It is a position he
has occupied since the summer of 1988. During the recent term that
Canada had on the Security Council (1989 to the end of 1990), he
was the Deputy Representative to the Security Council. He was-and
this is of greatest importance to our discussion-the Vice Chairman
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of the Security Council Committee on Sanctions against Iraq and
Chairman of the Subcommittee on States Confronted with Special
Economic Problems as a result of these sanctions. Ambassador Kirsch
is the Chairman of the U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations working group. He has spent his career in the Department
of External Affairs, has had postings in various places and has in
the past been posted to the Canadian Mission from 1977 to 1981. He
has devoted a significant part of his career to international law and
has been a member of the Quebec Bar since 1970, is a graduate of
the University of Montreal and was appointed Queen's Counsel in
1988. At External Affairs, he has been the Director of Legal Operations
Division, Ambassador and Agent from Canada in an international
arbitration of fisheries, and represented Canada in the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly of which he was the Chairman in 1982. He
was in 1988 the President of the I.K.A.O. Conference for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports, Chairman of the
Subcommittee of the IMO Conference of the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Treaty of Maritime Navigation. He has written
extensively on various subjects relating to international law and to
the United Nations. He comes to us with an expertise in a large
number of areas, but with a particular and very recent expertise in
the aspects of the powers of the Security Council where in fact he
practiced U.N. law. Ambassador Kirsch...
The Powers of the Security Council
AMBASSADOR KIRSCH: Thank you very much. Mr. Rusk's presen-
tation has made mine easier, not only by making clear that the Security
Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international
peace and security which I assume you knew, but also by pointing
to some elements that are essential to understand how the Council
functions or does not function, and I am thinking in particular of
the cooperation among its members, and particularly the permanent
members, and also because it is impossible to understand how the
Council has evolved, how its powers originally were supposed to be
different, really, from what they have become because of the Cold
War. It is impossible to understand the Council without making
reference to that. You know, of course, that the Council acts on
behalf of all the members of the United Nations in carrying out these
responsibilities, and that its decisions are binding on all its members.
Not all members necessarily comply by the decisions, but they are
binding.
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Simply put, the role of the Council is to bring about the peaceful
settlement of disputes and to take appropriate actions in cases where
the peace has been threatened, or breached, and where acts of ag-
gression have occurred. The way I would like to approach the subject
of the powers of the Council is to deal first of all with what are the
powers of the Council as described in the Charter, then the powers
as they have evolved in practice, and the limits of the powers to the
Council, and its potential. This is a broad subject and I think I would
prefer to concentrate on certain topics that are particularly relevant
today.
I will not deal with certain issues that have become really marginal,
such as the connection with the trusteeship council and its role in
disarmament, and I will not deal either with the question of regional
arrangements which will be dealt with much more competently by my
neighbor here, Mr. Caminos.
The general powers of the Council are described in Article 24 of
the Charter, which essentially I have summarized, and then in certain
chapters. I would like to concentrate on two chapters in particular,
lightly on Chapter 6 which deals with the peaceful settlement of
disputes and more extensively on Chapter 7 which deals with en-
forcement action.
The principal of Chapter 6 on peaceful settlement of disputes is
that the onus is on states to resolve their own problems among
themselves or through regional arrangements by peaceful means, but
the Council has a role if it deems it necessary. It can call the parties
to settle and it can also investigate disputes and situations in order
to determine threats to international peace and security and it can
make recommendations for appropriate procedures or methods of
settlement. This is really all I am going to say on Chapter 6 because
Chapter 6, which is almost never invoked, is used all the time in
virtually all resolutions in which the Council calls upon the parties
to do this or that; there is an implicit reference to Chapter 6.
Now Chapter 7 forms the heart of the Security Council machinery
and powers as seen by the drafters of the Charter. The Council was
granted strong and centralized powers to deal with threats to and
breaches of peace and acts of aggression. Chapter 7 is much more
specific than Chapter 6 as to what these powers are. The main elements
are, I think, very familiar now. The Council may call upon the parties
concerned to comply with provisional measures, it may use measures
not involving the use of armed forces, including of course economic
sanctions as was done in the case of Iraq, and then if these measures
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are deemed to be inadequate, it may authorize action as may be
necessary involving the use of armed force.
These are roughly the powers of the Council under Chapter 7. But
I would like to mention other provisions which were supposed to give
teeth to these powers and which are particularly relevant today because
they have not been used. One is that all member states of the U.N.
were supposed to make available to the Council armed forces, assis-
tance, and facilities. And in another, a national air force is contingent
also for enforcement action purposes. So there could be, essentially,
a U.N. army.
And then there would be a Military Staff Committee that would
advise and assist the Council on military requirements and the de-
ployment and command of armed forces, and it would also be re-
sponsible under the Council for the strategic direction of armed forces.
So it was a centralized system, and as Mr. Rusk mentioned, it assumed
that the members in the Council would be able to agree on the
development and use of the mechanisms provided for its use in the
Charter. And cooperation among the permanent members was, of
course, essential because as was mentioned by Mr. Rusk, all the
permanent members have a veto on any substantive decision.
What happened in practice, until recently, was not very much of
what was intended, largely because of the Cold War. Limited sanctions
were applied in the case of Rhodesia and South Africa, but they were
riothing compared to what was done in the case of Iraq. Compliance
with the sanctions in the case of Iraq was rather good, but irrespective
of what effect they had on Iraq's ability to pursue the war, the
economic impact of those sanctions on other states was enormous.
And this, I think, was one of the discoveries of this episode, what
a double-edged sword sanctions in fact are. There was a provision in
the Charter aimed at encouraging provision of assistance to states
which have suffered particular economic consequences to which Pro-
fessor Wilner referred, and this was done. This was acted upon, but
between a decision in principal and actual delivery of assistance, there
has been and there continues to be quite a gap.
As I said before, there was supposed to be a U.N. army at the
disposal of the Council. Well, this army never materialized. The states
did not put armed forces at the disposal of the Council because of
lack of agreement on modalities. The permanent members had con-
tinued and prolonged disagreements in a variety of areas and exercised
their vetoes. And until recently, the only military operation authorized
by the Council as Mr. Rusk mentioned was Korea, but this is something
that is unlikely ever to repeat itself. I just cannot imagine a permanent
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member being absent from the Council in circumstances like that
today.
What are the consequences of those changes on the way the system
functions? I see three. One is that simply for political reasons, the
powers of enforcement of the Council were simply not used. They
were out of the question because of the fundamental opposition
between the super powers. Even Korea was not technically an en-
forcement action. Even now this is probably not going to be the
majority of the action taken by the Council.
The second consequence is the mechanisms that were supposed to
be used as far as enforcement were not in place when the time came
to use them, like in the case of the Gulf crisis. So the Security Council
could not produce an armed force-a U.N. armed force did not
exist-and had to use a non-U.N. force operating under its authority.
Now this is perfectly permissible, for there is an article which provides
for that, but it is also clearly not exactly the way the founders of
the Charter were envisioning the functioning of the Council.
This also raised other issues. It raises a question as to the degree
to which the Security Council has remained in control of the operation
once launched, in the case of the Gulf, but again this is not really
my subject.
So as a first consequence, the enforcement powers were not used
for a long time and as the second consequence, when they were used,
they were used in a different way from that which was anticipated
initially. The third consequence was that the Council then had to
develop something to deal with threats to peace and security, and in
particular, acts of aggression which were short of enforcement action.
This is how the peacekeeping operations were born.
Essentially they were holding actions, the peacekeepers were inter-
posed between belligerents out of necessity, a practical response to a
problem requiring action. They have been used to supervise and have
maintained cease fires to assist in troop withdrawals and to provide
a buffer between opposing forces, but they are also a flexible instru-
ment. And the last point I would make on this, a second point I
would make on this, is that as the cooperation among the major
powers improved and increased, the peacekeeping operations recently
were almost always put into a context, a lot of other things were
done by the Council, aimed at ensuring a lasting peace with various
measures taken of a political nature, of an economic nature, of a
humanitarian nature such as refugees, and all that.
To differentiate, in practice, the peacekeeping operations from en-
forcement actions, I think, only one point needs to be made: that is
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that although there was never a paper written as to what exactly they
were and what they should do because of fundamental opposition
between the super powers for a long time, there was eventually an
informal agreement as to the conditions that would allow peacekeeping
operations to be established and one of the conditions was that it
could be established only through the consent of the parties to the
conflict in question, which by definition is not the case of enforcement
action.
The result of peacekeeping missions have been generally very good.
Some mandates have not been achieved; Lebanon and Cyprus are
two cases in point. But even then they have brought about a reduced
level of conflict, certainly, and they have also provided a lot of
humanitarian assistance and other services which would not be avail-
able otherwise.
In considering the limit of the role of the Council, I think you
have to keep in mind two factors: one, that the Council can be
involved in an issue only if there is some connection with the main-
tenance of peace and security; and two, that other U.N. bodies, and
most particularly the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs, have
defined functions which are not supposed to be infringed upon, either.
I am sure Professor Sohn will talk about this also.
Generally speaking, there has been a great deal of flexibility on the
part of the members of the Council in interpreting its functions. It
has been seen particularly clearly in the case for example of Namibia
where the Council took responsibility for a whole set of issues including
military deployment, police elections, and all that. In other cases, and
you begin there to see some tension, for example, the case of Central
America, which was also a very diversified operation and probably
the most interesting in terms of what it has done, you can see that
the Council was only responsible for part of it. Some other things
were done by the General Assembly and/or by the Secretary General.
Before saying why that is the case, I would like to mention the
fact that a couple of years ago and last year there were attempts to
bring certain issues into the Council which were not really a part of
its traditional mandate. The first two cases were terrorism, two re-
solutions on terrorism a couple of years ago, which were adopted
without major difficulty. But then a delegation, the United Kingdom,
tried the following year, having been successful the first time, to put
the question of drug trafficking as an issue that the Council should
deal with, and this failed. This failed because theoretically the members
of the Council consider this issue as being within the mandate of the
General Assembly, that is there is no obvious connection with peace
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and security. But in reality I think the issue is quite different. The
issue is that the Security Council is small in membership and developed
States have proportionate representation in the Council, much bigger
proportionately than anywhere else, so there are a number of countries,
particularly Third World countries, which are nervous at the idea of
seeing the mandate of the Council span beyond traditional questions.
And there have been other cases also. Some attempt to introduce
elections in Haiti into the Council, which failed also, and human
rights issues which were never discussed publicly, nor was the Haiti
question, and human rights issues in Rumania before the change in
government there and in China. Beyond the reasons that I have already
given for why the Council is unable to deal with certain issues, there
is another one which is that many states remain extremely sensitive
to the possibility that not only the Council but the U.N. in general
might begin to circumvent the last, but not the least, of the principals
of the Charter-that is the prohibition on the U.N. generally to
intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state.
The potential of the Council can be dealt with quickly. Enforcement
action is, I think, continuing to be an exceptional situation for a
variety of reasons. You need to have a very clear case of aggression.
You need to have a predisposition of the major powers to cooperate.
You also need a situation, obviously, where one of the major powers
does not consider the aggressor as a client-state, but you also need
to have a situation of such gravity that the major powers' interests
are sufficiently affected to justify the major investment of resources
and the major political and economic disruption and risks that an
enforcement action entails. More optimistically, it is to be hoped that
since this enforcement action has worked it could indeed work, it will
indeed work as a deterrent for future aggressors.
My impression is that the main role of the Council is going to
continue to be in peacekeeping and peacemaking, again depending on
the cooperation of the super powers. I am rather optimistic about
that cooperation. Even though there are difficulties, major powers all
have a fairly clear interest in having a stable world, and I do not
anticipate the kind of fundamental opposition that used to exist in
the Council before.
Peacemaking itself will have to be defined because at this stage it
is done in a variety of different ways with very different mechanisms
starting with the state of a region using only the U.N. mechanism.
The Central American issue is a very good example of that. You also
have a very important role of the Secretary General and the major
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powers, who have played a very important role, in the case, for
example, of Cambodia.
The one area, and I will finish with that, that has been underde-
veloped today is the question of prevention of conflict. There is
growing interest in that; the General Assembly in fact adopted a
declaration on this question a couple of years ago, which shows that
there is a desire that the state should become more active in trying
to prevent a conflict and there are all sorts of ideas also relating to
how the Secretary General's role might be expanded in this area.
There is now another draft of the declaration being developed on fact
finding, and one of its purposes could be to try to achieve prevention
of conflict. But this issue to this day is very difficult to deal with.
It raises a number of complex questions ranging from the sensitivity
of states to anything suggesting interference with their internal affairs,
or in fact suggesting that they in fact intend to do something aggressive,
which of course everyone will deny until the aggression has been
committed, and it also raises questions about the capacity of the
Secretary General to provide early warnings of potentially threatening
situations. It raises questions about the implications of peacekeeping
and the relationship of those organs of the U.N. which are so jealous
of their respective prerogatives. But nevertheless this is something that
should continue to be worked on because ultimately is the way that
a really better world could be developed. Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR WILNER: Thank you very much, Ambassador Kirsch, for
your first comments. We expect to hear from you again this afternoon.
Ambassador Kirsch indicated some of the problems and some of
the issues involved in the relationships between the great political
organs of the United Nations. On the one hand, the Security Council
and its major principal role in the maintenance of peace and that of
the General Assembly and the role, of course, of the Secretary General,
whose role I am sure we will be told, has fluctuated over the decades.
The speaker that we are going to hear from next is obviously one of
the men in the field. This is really having the information from the
horse's mouth. Professor Louis Sohn is, we are very proud to say,
the Woodruff Professor of International Law at the University of
Georgia School of Law. He was for some time at another law school,
namely Harvard, where he was Bemis Professor of International Law.
He has been the President of the American Society of International
Law. He was at the San Francisco Conference at which the United
Nations Charter was drafted, and has, of course, commented and
contributed to the building of the United Nations system since then.
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Obviously you know about his writings, and about the other honors
and responsibilities that he has had over the years. Professor Sohn
will discuss the role of the General Assembly and the Secretary General
in the general context of inquiry. Professor Sohn...
The Role of the General Assembly and the Secretary General
PROFESSOR SOHN : Thank you, Professor Wilner. You mentioned I
was at San Francisco and I thought it would be very proper to start
with what happened at that conference.
One of the big fights at the Conference was about this very question.
What should be the relationship between the General Assembly and
the Security Council? First, we have to point out that the idea of the
United Nations was supposed to be quite different from the idea of
the League of Nations. In the League of Nations, we had division
of power simply nonexisting. Both the Council of the League and the
General Assembly of the League were of equal power. Any question
of any kind could be presented to either of them. And in order to
make it palatable, the rule of unanimity was applicable in both;
therefore, a small power could very easily block the majority of the
General Assembly and there was no problem about worrying about
too much interference in domestic matters.
In the United Nations, they decided on something different. Let us
divide things by subject. The Security Council was to deal only with
questions of maintenance of international peace and security. The
General Assembly was supposed to deal with everything else. And
that else was quite a lot. At the same time it was quite clear at San
Francisco, that there was -a connection between those two things-
between maintenance of peace and maintenance of well-being of the
population of the world. As often happens when a treaty is adopted,
the draftsmen of the treaty have to defend it later before the Senate
of the United States when it is asked to give its consent to the
ratification. The man who was in a way the mastermind behind the
preparation of the United States of the Charter, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky
was put on the carpet by several Senators who asked why such
important powers, embracing practically everything under the sun,
were given to the General Assembly? And without hesitation he replied
that the General Assembly's function obviously will involve a very
wide and complicated field of activity: the field of economics, social,
cultural, and educational problems. So it was thought that if the
General Assembly, which is the most representative body, were given
the function of having primary responsibility in that vast and all
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important field, it would then be the agency bringing about conditions
in which the use of force as the ultimate sanction would be less and
less necessary. If you have well-being around the world, and people
are happy and satisfied, use of force will not be necessary. That was
a very nice, simple, but perhaps not very realizable, idea.
At the same time it was thought that by having such nice agenda,
the General Assembly would be satisfied with that and would not
meddle in what the small Security Council would have to do about
peace and security. It was argued that an emergency requires speedy
action, that any use of force by the United Nations would require
the support of the five powerful members of the Security Council,
and that peace would be greatly endangered if some of them tried to
take such action over the opposition of one of them. As a result, to
prevent that, each of them was granted the right of veto of any
decision that might lead to an enforcement action.
The Security Council was given primary responsibility-we are told
by Ambassador Kirsch-for the maintenance of peace and security,
and each decision supported by all the major powers should be binding
then on all the states. While the insertion of these instructions satisfied
the major powers, the smaller ones worried about something else. If
one of them should be threatened by one of the big powers or one
of their friends or allies, the U.N. would not be able to come to their
rescue. To address that imbalance, the smaller powers, led by Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Mexico, and New Zealand, made various proposals
to strengthen the role of the General Assembly in situations likely to
endanger international peace. To achieve this goal they started to
propose a variety of amendments to the draft of the Charter which
was prepared by the big powers several months before at Dumbarton
Oaks in Washington in October 1944.
One of the first skirmishes occurred when it was agreed that the
Security Council would make its reports to the General Assembly on
measures taken by the Council to maintain international peace and
security. Small powers proposed then that the General Assembly be
given powers to approve or disapprove the Security Council's report.
When the major powers opposed this proposal, a more moderate one
was substituted which merely empowered the General Assembly to
receive and consider the reports. However, in the follow-up discussions,
the major powers were forced to agree that the General Assembly
would be free to discuss any question relating to maintenance of
international peace and security brought before it by any member of
the United Nations or perhaps by the Security Council itself. And
the General Assembly would be allowed to make recommendations
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with regard to any such question to the state or states concerned or
to the Security Council, or to both. However, as that sounded like
too much to the big powers, one important restriction was imposed.
The General Assembly must refer to the Security Council any questions
on which action is necessary, and what the word "action" means
caused later some big problems.
In addition, to avoid conflicting decisions, the General Assembly
was prohibited from making any recommendations with regard to a
dispute or situation as long as the dispute or situation was being dealt
with by the Security Council, and at the very beginning of its session
of the General Assembly, the Secretary General gives a list of some-
where around 100 issues which are the Security Council's agenda.
More vaguely, the General Assembly was authorized after some
battle to discuss general principles of cooperation and the maintenance
of peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament
and the regulation of arms and to make recommendations with respect
to such principles to the members of the Security Council, or to both.
The major powers thought they had satisfied sufficiently the small
ones and there would be no trouble, but to everybody's surprise, at
the very end of the Conference, in the middle of June, a new issue
arose. The small powers made again an attempt to broaden the General
Assembly's role by asserting that the Assembly is the town meeting
of the world-a very nice phrase-and must have the power to discuss
and make recommendations in respect of any methods within the
sphere of international relations. They claimed that the General As-
sembly must have an unlimited right of discussion with respect to
such matters.
The Soviet delegation strongly objected to this idea and insisted
that its right of discussion be limited only to matters that affected
the maintenance of international peace and security and that this right
should be subject to the various restrictions previously agreed upon.
One problem was, of course, that the Soviet Union and all the other
big states worried that the General Assembly might use this power
to deal with matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of
states. That can be stopped at the Council by a veto but it cannot
be stopped by a veto in the General Assembly.
The United States was unclear at the beginning as to which side it
was on, but it was under strong pressure from the other countries,
and there was the fact that the United States delegation had two
members, Senator Vandenberg and Governor Stassen, who were very
strongly for broadening the powers of the Assembly. So something
had to be done.
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The people at San Francisco worried that this issue might break
the Conference and we might not have a Charter. So they suggested
that we ought to ask Ambassador Harriman, who was then negotiating
in Moscow about possible economic aid to the Soviet Union, to tell
him about the crisis and impress upon Molotov the Foreign Minister
the need to conclude the Conference expeditiously and that this issue
was a real stumbling block because if we don't get the Charter now,
we are not going to get it later.
Molotov, however, refused to change his position and Harriman
had to go over his head to Marshal Stalin, who finally overruled
Molotov and ordered him to accept a compromise language allowing
the Assembly to discuss and make recommendations upon any question
or matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers
and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter. Of
course, there is an exception-the General Assembly may not make
any recommendations when the matter is being dealt with by the
Security Council although it was argued that if somebody didn't want
the matter being dealt with by the Assembly, the easiest thing to do
would be to put it on the agenda of the Security Council.
Reluctantly, the small powers accepted it and you could almost at
that time see that we would have another big battle to the very end
about the veto rights in the first place.
Now I would like to say a few words about the practice of the
United Nations after the Charter came into force. One thing happened
to the Security Council; the General Assembly did not hesitate to
interpret broadly its powers under the Charter. One of the most
important big debates related to the Palestine case (not yet solved),
where the Security Council rejected the request of the General As-
sembly that the Council should implement the Assembly's plan for
the partition of the country. And you will remember this was divided
into three parts; Israel, Arab States, and a separate small area around
Jerusalem which would have become a trusteeship under the actual
jurisdiction of the United Nations.
When the Council received the request, there was some debate about
it, but finally the United States representative, Senator Austin, ad-
mitted that the Charter of the United Nations does not empower the
Security Council to enforce a political settlement, whether it is pursuant
to a recommendation of the General Assembly or of the Security
Council itself. At the same time he pointed out that the Security
Council is authorized to take forceful measures with respect to Pa-
lestine to remove a threat to the peace, and it can take action to
prevent aggression against Palestine from outside and, he added, even
a threat to international peace and security coming from inside Pa-
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lestine. But then he said action by the Council would be directed
solely to the maintenance of peace and not to enforcing a petition.
As you know, a few months later the fighting started nevertheless in
Palestine, and all the exhortations of the Council on the subject were
disregarded by the belligerents. Finally the Council decided, yes, the
situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace, in the meaning
of the Charter, and would become even a breach of the peace if they
do not stop soon. And it ordered, therefore, an immediate cease-fire.
At that point, finally, the parties complied and a truce came into
effect three days later and the boundaries between the parties were
of course quite different at that point than the original boundaries
described by the General Assembly. If you look at it now so many
years later, it might have been probably better if the Council had
enforced the Assembly's decision.
Next, that issue arose also with respect to the case already men-
tioned, the Korean conflict. At the beginning the Security Council
was able to recommend that the members of the United Nations
furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to
repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security
in the area, language quite similar to what we have done recently in
Kuwait, and in particular that they should put their military forces
and other assistance under a unified command to be established by
the United States. However, later the Soviet Union returned to the
Security Council and vetoed any further action by that body, and it
was then that the General Assembly stepped in and recommended
that all proper steps be taken to assure conditions of stability through-
out Korea. General MacArthur immediately interpreted this resolution
as authorizing the United Nations forces at his command to enter
North Korea and to completely destroy the North Korean army. The
People's Republic of China then intervened and it was the General
Assembly that determined that China, in giving direct aid and assis-
tance to those who were already committing an aggression in Korea
by engaging in hostilities against the United Nations forces there, had
itself engaged in aggression in Korea. After a further study the General
Assembly recommended economic sanctions against both North Korea
and China, and most member states imposed immediate and necessary
restrictions in their trade with these countries and those restrictions
lasted quite a number of years.
You wonder what was the basis for this action of the Assembly?
The basis was the fact that a few months before the General Assembly
was called to do something about this difficulty in Korea, the same
session of the Assembly decided to deal directly with the issue of
rights and duties with regard to maintenance of peace and security.
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It adopted something called the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution. This
recognized the primary responsibility of the Security Council, but
asserted at the same time that if the Security Council because of the
lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in
any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly has the right,
and the obligation, to consider the matter immediately with a view
to making appropriate recommendations to members of collective
measures, and if there is a breach of the peace or act of aggression
the General Assembly shall when necessary recommend the use of
armed force. In addition, to facilitate the use of force by either the
General Assembly or the Security Council, the Assembly recommended
that each member of the United Nations maintain within its national
armed forces elements so trained, organized, and equipped that they
could promptly be made available in accordance with its constitutional
processes for services as a United Nations unit or units.
Several states, including Canada and the Scandinavian countries,
established such units, which proved to be readily available later for
peacekeeping activities of the kind that Ambassador Kirsch described.
It is ironic that the first use of this procedure after the Korean case
occurred during the Suez crisis when Israel, retaliating against terrorist
excursions from the Sinai peninsula, invaded that peninsula and was
able to get all the way almost to the Suez Canal. This gave an excuse
to the United Kingdom and France to send a military force to protect
the Suez Canal against the possible destruction that would have af-
fected the supply of oil to Europe-a problem of great importance
recently. When Egypt asked the Security Council for assistance, France
and the United Kingdom vetoed that resolution and the matter was
transferred under the Uniting for Peace Resolution to the General
Assembly.
As a result of another Canadian initiative, for which Mr. Pearson
later got the Nobel Peace Prize, the General Assembly authorized the
establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to secure
and supervise the cessation of hostilities and to ensure that the parties
to the armistice agreement would withdraw their forces behind the
armistice line, desist from raids across the armistice line, and observe
scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements. The United
Nations Emergency Force was promptly established, the French and
British forces left soon thereafter, and after the United Nations agreed
to place the United Nations Emergency Force on either end of the
Egyptian armistice line, Israel evacuated the Sinai peninsula.
19921
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
As a result of the United Nations presence, the boundary raids
ceased and the Israeli border remained quiescent until a new crisis in
1967, which was provoked by the Egyptian request that the United
Nations forces be withdrawn. This led to the new hostilities between
Israel and several neighbors, resulting in Israeli occupation of the
Gaza strip, the west bank of Jordan, Jerusalem, Golan Heights and
Sinai Peninsula, a problem that we are still having with us.
Before even the second part of the Palestine issue arose, we got
another crisis, the civil war in newly independent Congo, involving
the introduction of the Belgian forces to protect the Belgian nationals
who were remaining in the area, and the attempted secession of
Katanga, the Congo's richest province. The Security Council itself
was able to agree initially on the creation of the United Nations force
for the Congo, known as ONUC (using its French initials) in which
almost 100,000 soldiers served in rotation, not all at the same time,
between 1960 and 1964, mostly coming from African countries but
including as well contingents from other countries.
Later a dispute arose between the Soviet Union and the Secretary
General about the role to be played by the force in the hostilities
between various factions and about the Soviet assistance to one of
these factions. The Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution
and the African countries then requested that the matter be transferred
to an emergency session of the General Assembly under the Uniting
for Peace Resolution.
That session of the Assembly confirmed the mandate of the Secretary
General to assist the central government of the Congo in the restoration
and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the
Republic of the Congo and to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity
and political independence, especially in view of the possible secession
of Katanga. At the same time, it called upon all states to refrain
from direct and indirect provision of arms and military personnel,
except upon request of the United Nations or the Secretary General,
a provision that the Soviet Union previously objected to in the Security
Council.
The matter returned, however, later to the Security Council which
not only confirmed most of this resolution by the General Assembly
but also authorized the United Nations to take immediately all ap-
propriate measures to prevent the recurrence of civil war in the Congo,
including arrangements for cease fire, the halting of military opera-
tions, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. So there
was another possible use of force.
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After Secretary General Hammarskj6ld died in a mysterious plane
crash on his way to arrange a cease-fire in the Congo, his successor
U Thant was authorized by the Security Council to take vigorous
action, including the use of requisite measures of force if necessary,
for the immediate apprehension, detention, and deportation of all
foreign military and paramilitary personnel and mercenaries of that
area of the Congo. On the basis of that authorization, the United
Nations force, on the pretext that the mercenary forces were interfering
with its freedom of movement, took military action to restore that
freedom, and in the process happened to demolish the Katangese
forces and ended the Katangese secession.
One consequence of this particular venture, and also the .fact that
the United Nations force in the Sinai Peninsula was staying there for
many years, some states including France and the Soviet Union refused
to pay their share of those expenses on the grounds that the aggressors
should pay for them or because the decision on the method of payment
should have been taken by the Security Council, not the General
Assembly. This last issue was referred to the International Court of
Justice for an advisory opinion, and the Court used that occasion to
pass also on the validity of the underlying General Assembly decision
authorizing the establishment of the first force and broadening the
mandate of the second force.
The Court pointed out that the responsibility of the Security Council
for the maintenance of peace was primary but not exclusive and that
the Charter makes it abundantly clear that the General Assembly also
is to be concerned with international peace and security. It relied on
Article 14 of the Charter that authorizes the Assembly to recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, including those
resulting from a violation of the provisions from the Charter. It was
pointed out that the word "measures" implied some kind of action
that showed that the functions and powers of the General Assembly
were not confined to discussion and the making of recommendations.
Article 12(2) provides that the General Assembly must refer to the
Security Council any question on which action is necessary, and the
Court held that this phrase refers only to coercive or enforcement
action. Only the Security Council can make enforcement decisions
that are binding on member states, but the General Assembly can
nevertheless make recommendations to states, organize peacekeeping
organizations at their request, or with the consent of the states con-
cerned. Later it was pointed out that even the decisions of the Security
Council that led to the action in Korea were just recommendations,
and that, therefore, if the General Assembly can make that kind of
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recommendations that are not binding, and states are willing to follow
them, then this is sufficient.
There are several other examples of the General Assembly initiatives
in the field of peace and security but time does not permit me to
discuss them. I am not able either to discuss the role of the Secretary
General. However, I would like to say one word about the Assembly's
power to make recommendations concerning the general principles of
cooperation and the maintenance of international peace under Article
11(1). The General Assembly was able to adopt by consensus important
interpretations of the Charter of the United Nations, such as a def-
inition of aggression and the Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States.
That decision codified the United Nations practice with respect to the
prohibition of the use of force, the duty to settle international disputes
by peaceful means, and nonintervention in matters within domestic
jurisdiction of states, the principle of self-determination of peoples
and the principle of sovereign equality of states, and the obligation
to fulfill in good faith obligations assumed by members in accordance
with the present Charter.
So this little phrase in the Charter permitted a very elaborate
codification of the laws of the United Nations up to that point-in
1970-and very interestingly when another issue came before the Court
in the Nicaraguan case, the Court said that the provisions of the
Charter plus this interpretation of them by the General Assembly in
the Friendly Relations Declaration have now become customary in-
ternational law binding not only on the members of the United Nations
but even states not members of the United Nations and became jus
cogens that prevails over everything else. So I must say that it is by
now clear that the General Assembly has certain powers in the area
of peace and security.
WILNER: Thank you Professor Sohn. We now have a basis for our
discussion of these powers and a discussion particularly of examples
which we will of course take up next. Mr. Caminos is going to continue
on the issue of a regional arrangement.
Our next speaker, who will be speaking on U.N. cooperation with
regional organizations with respect to the maintenance of peace, is
Dr. Caminos, who is the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs and
Legal Counsel for the Organization of American States. He has been
in that office since 1984. He was Professor of Public International
Law at the University of Buenos Aires, was the Director of Inter-
national Organizations at the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Legal Counsel, Argentine Ambassador to Brazil from 1981 to
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1984, and then as many of you know he was the Deputy-Director of
the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea from 1974 to 1981,
and was a representative of Argentina to the United Nations, the
OAS, and at various international conferences. He has lectured in the
external program of the Hague Academy and has been involved as
Director of Studies at the Hague, worked with UNITAR, and is active
in a number of international organizations. Dr. Caminos is uniquely
placed, of course, as legal counsel to an important regional organi-
zation and in view of his experience with the United Nations, to
discuss the issue of cooperation under the Charter between the U.N.
and regional organizations in the maintenance of peace.
United Nations Cooperation with Regional Organizations
AMBASSADOR CAMIios: Thank you very much Professor Wilner. Let
me begin by saying that I was also present at the San Francisco
Conference in 1945, and I was a witness as a journalist to the efforts
carried out by the Latin American delegation to get some place under
the sun in the new Charter that was going to be adopted. They had
met two months before in Mexico and adopted the Act of Tepalcatepec
in 1945, and they succeeded to a certain extent in getting the so-called
"Vandenberg" formula in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter regarding
the right of individual and collective self-defense, which enabled them
to avoid the veto of the permanent members of the Security Council
that was for any sort of use of force as was included in the Dumbarton
Oaks proposals.
Now the Charter of the United Nations, as all of you know, deals
with the relationship between the U.N. and regional arrangements or
agencies in three different chapters. Chapters 6, 7, and 8, which carries
the title of Regional Arrangements, emerged from a compromise
between universalism and regionalism and moreover a compromise in
which, as is so often the case with compromises, there existed latent
ambiguities. I will try in this brief presentation to deal with different
areas of cooperation and of course of conflicts, too, between the
universal organization and regional organizations. Although my anal-
ysis will focus specifically on the relationship between the Organization
of American States (OAS) and the United Nations, this does not mean
that I place the OAS in a sort of privileged position vis-a-vis other
regional arrangements or agencies. On the contrary, most of my
comments are applicable to regional organizations in general. In fact,
there was a single proposal in San Francisco to make a definition of
what is an international regional organization, and this proposal by
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an Egyptian delegate was not accepted but he referred to different
ties: cultural, economic, geographical, historical, which really formed
the basis for the establishment of the real international regional or-
ganization.
Let me say a few words, first, about coordination between the
United Nations and the OAS in this case, in the area of settlement
disputes. Well, I will not repeat provisions in the U.N. Charter which
everyone knows, but the problem arose in the OAS precisely because
of the paralysis of the Security Council due to the Cold War. It was
necessary to give a definite priority to the methods to settle disputes
at the regional level before taking the dispute to the United Nations,
to the Security Council, and this was reflected in several texts of the
instruments approved by the OAS including the Charter, including
the Pact of Bogata for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes which still
exists and says that members or parties to the pact should settle their
disputes regionally before taking them to the Security Council-which
is absurd, because if they settled the dispute, there would be no
dispute to take to the Council. However, this change toward region-
alism in the hemisphere is finished, because after several experiences,
after claims from OAS members of their right of a direct access
according with their own Charter which you know has prevalence
according to Article 103 over any other treaty, then the text of the
Charter of the OAS, of the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance
Treaty, Real Treaty, were changed. This new change included a par-
agraph providing that all these efforts that had to be made at the
regional level to solve or to settle the disputes did not impair the
right to take the case directly to the United Nations under Articles
33, 34, and 35 of the U.N. Charter. So, this dispute is finished, is
settled, in favor I would say of the universalist approach. However,
this was the result of a very difficult experience in which there were
many cases, and I will not go into them because you all know about
them, for instance the first one was in 1954, the Guatemala case in
which the government of Guatemala had to resort to the Security
Council and through different political procedures was denied both
in the OAS and in the Council to hear their claim of aggression on
the part of the United States. But as I said, I don't have the time
to go into this.
The second area about which I would like to say a few words is
the cooperation between the OAS and the United Nations for the
maintenance of collective security. Regional arrangements enjoy an
almost complete autonomy in the exercise of the competence of a
peaceful settlement of interregional disputes. Indeed, Article 52(3) of
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the Charter of the United Nations charges the Security Council with
the obligation of encouraging the development of such competence.
However, when we talk about collective security, this is different.
In Chapter 8, Article 53 states that no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangement or by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council. There are two exceptions to
this Article, both of which are found in the same paragraph of Article
53: the right of self-defense which I have just mentioned, and the
measures taken against former enemy states in the Second World War.
The general principle is that coercive measures adopted by regional
arrangements or agencies cannot be applied without the authorization
of the Security Council.
This authorization must be given before the implementation of
measures but not necessarily prior to their adoption. In other words,
regional organizations may decide freely on the need to adopt coercive
measures, but they must obtain the Security Council's authorization
before putting those measures into action. Of course, this competence
presupposes the regional organization's ability to examine the situation
in order to determine whether there exists a threat to the peace or
an act of aggression in the region.
Up to this point the regional organization may act in complete
autonomy in contemplation of activities for the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security, but with the obligation of keeping the
Security Council at all times fully informed of such activities pursuant
to Article 54 of the Charter.
Now, as I said, all of the discussion that has been going on for
several decades is or lies in the interpretation of this phrase in Article
53 which says that "no enforcement action shall be taken by regional
arrangements or agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council." This question was also the subject of controversy in the
first case that diplomatic and economic sanctions were adopted at the
regional level against the Dominican Republic in 1960, and the Cuban
case of expulsion from the OAS in 1962. So all of these problems
were brought to the Security Council, especially through the states
affected by this sanction. I will not go into the details of these cases
that did not decide the issue, but the fact is that the sanctions were
applied in both instances and, as you all know, still the government
of Cuba is excluded from participating in the activities of the Or-
ganization of American States under the sanctions approved at Punta
del Este by the order of consultation of foreign ministers in this
meeting and this question is still in force.
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The other case that was a very interesting one was the application
not of sanctions of economic or diplomatic nature, but sanctions of
an enforcement of the coercive nature, and that was the missile crisis
in 1962 when the United States declared the quarantine around Cuba,
and of course this question, as you know, led to a very tense inter-
national situation. The quarantine was confirmed by a position at the
regional level of the order and consultation of foreign ministers which
decided to recommend that the member states in accordance with
Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
take all measures individually and collectively-including the use of
armed force-which they may deem necessary to ensure that the
government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the senior Soviet
powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the
peace and security of the continent and to prevent the missiles in
Cuba with offensive capabilities from ever becoming an active threat
to the peace and security of the continent. The fact is that this measure
was applied and later on as you all know there was an agreement
between President Kennedy and Secretary Krushchev which put an
end to the dispute.
Also, the other case where the use of force was applied by a regional
organization was in the case of the Dominican Republic in 1965 in
which the United States invaded the Dominican Republic and after
that, ex post facto, the OAS at the regional level adopted a resolution
which legitimized, at least at the regional level, the action taken by
the government of the United States. And of course there have been
in the region many other cases of the use of force, but not necessarily
as a result of the position of the regional organization, rather from
different acts of aggression and I would not deal with that in detail.
But the important thing is that through these experiences, the prac-
tice has developed in the sense that the measures referred to in Article
41 of the U.N. Charter, namely those that do not involve the use of
force, could be applied by the regional organization. Those measures
that require definitely the approval or authorization, and not ex post
facto but previously, are the measures involving the use of armed
force. I remember, I will recall here, the position that was supported
by the United Kingdom at the time of the debate of the Dominican
Republic case in 1960, not the second one in 1965. The British
Representative on the Security Council said that when Article 53 refers
to enforcement action, it must be contemplating the exercise of force
in a manner which would not normally be legitimate for any state
or group of states except under the authority of a Security Council
resolution. Other pacifying actions, under regional arrangement as
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listed in Chapter 7 of the Charter (we do not come into this category)
have simply to be brought to the attention to the Security Council
under Article 54.
Now, I would like to refer more in detail about the cooperation
between the United Nations and the regional organizations; in this
case the OAS, in the field of peacekeeping operations, that have been
mentioned by both previous speakers.
Although you know the term peacekeeping is not found in the
Charter, the concept has come to be accepted as an anti-escalation
device used in the restoration of maintenance of peace. As is well
known, U.N. peacekeeping operations have been used with mixed
results in a variety of international conflicts. The competence of the
regional organizations to carry out these peacekeeping operations within
these regions derives from their relative competence to make every
effort to achieve pacific settlements of local disputes or situations.
Of course, these regional peacekeeping operations cannot involve en-
forcement actions which, under Article 53, would require U.N. Security
Council authorization. A regional organization, therefore, may un-
dertake peacekeeping operations autonomously pursuant to their own
internal procedures without the prior authorization from the Security
Council of the U.N. Peacekeeping operations usually involve the
position of forces, groups or missions in an area of conflict, with
the purpose of restoring or maintaining the peace or mitigating the
deteriorization of a situation. And, as has been mentioned today, the
two essential conditions to differentiate an enforcement action from
a peacekeeping operation are that in the latter, forces or missions
may only be stationed with the consent or at the request of the state
in whose territory they will act, and second, forces should be assigned
a strictly noncombatant role that is of a defensive or protective nature.
Therefore, the inter-American peace force that was created in 1965
in the Dominican Republic was not, from this point of view, a
peacekeeping operation because the forces attacked one of the con-
flicting parties in the Dominican Republic. Now, recently there has
been a very interesting development which I believe has also been
mentioned by Ambassador Kirsch, and this is the peacekeeping ac-
tivities of the OAS and U.N. Secretaries General. This is one of the
most important contributions to international organizations for the
maintenance of international peace in the recent peace process in
Central America. This development is unique for several reasons.
(a) All operations have been carried out with the parallel and
coordinated participation of the U.N. Secretary General and the OAS
Secretary General.
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(b) In the case of the Secretary General of the OAS, his participation
was sanctioned as part of the inherent powers recently attributed to
his office. This new role is in fact a consequence of the reform of
the OAS Charter which gave the Secretary General of the OAS similar
powers in the hemisphere to those granted to the U.N. Secretary
General under Article 99 of the U.N. Charter. This amendment ef-
fectively ended a trend whereby the Secretary General of the OAS
was considered to be an administrative officer deprived of all political
initiatives.
The first step in the coordination of U.N. or OAS peacekeeping
in the region took place on November 18, 1986 when the Secretaries
General jointly submitted a memo to the governments of the five
central American States involved and to the eight governments making
up the contra dora and support groups. The two officials expressed
their concern over the deepening crisis and outlined the services that
their respective organizations singly or jointly could render in support
of consolidated peace efforts in Central America. Some of these
services would require, in addition to the parties' consent, an au-
thorization from the appropriate organs of the United Nations, or of
the OAS, or of both. The fact that this document was presented
jointly by the Secretaries General is significant for it highlights the
potential for greater cooperation between the United Nations and
regional organizations in the field of peacekeeping and collective se-
curity.
For example, the document mentions inter alia the following serv-
ices, including the establishment of an appropriate presence, civil and
military, for the following purposes or a combination of them: ob-
servation of wartime incidents or reduction or withdrawal of armed
forces or dismantling of military bases or installations or disbandment
and resettlement of regular forces. I could go on. This is a very
interesting document which was not given to the public. It was only
given by the two Secretaries General at the meeting they held in New
York of all these representatives of the eight countries of the contra
dora group and the five Central American republics.
After that, the Secretaries General of the two organizations took
a very active role in the peace process in Central America. It started
with the so-called Arias plan. The Arias plan was in essence that the
Central American Republics decided to take the peace process into
their own hands. They requested the assistance of the two Secretaries
General and that led to the first international commission for veri-
fication and follow up in which both Secretaries General acted on an
equal footing in every respect and they presented a report after several
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days. The only difference, and I want to point out this, and this is
a characteristic of a regional action in these cases, is that while the
United Nations Secretary General-which is an office that has many
problems-appointed representatives for this task, the Secretary Gen-
eral of the OAS went personally. I can tell you that he has made in
the last couple of years at least twenty to thirty trips to Central
America, supervising the process in every respect on a personal basis.
The Secretary General of the OAS played a very important role in
the agreement of support which is very interesting because it is the
first agreement between the government of Nicaragua, the constitu-
tional government of Ortega and the Nicaraguan Resistance, and both
the Cardinal of Nicaragua and the Secretary General of the OAS.
For instance, the Secretary General of the OAS had to supervise the
application of the general amnesty for political prisoners. This gave
an increasing role to the Secretary General. The Secretary General
also played a role in the Tela agreement signed in August 1989 and
which created an international commission for verification and sup-
port. This Commission is known as the CR Commission. The two
Secretaries General sent a letter accepting the task and explaining to
the five Presidents of Central America, the terms of reference for the
fulfillment of their tasks. They had to perform a series of political
and diplomatic functions that they would assume directly. They would
create a military body following consultation with the OAS Secretary
General and the U.N. Security Council, and finally for receiving the
weapons from the Contras, from Nicaraguan Resistance, and also
humanitarian and development functions in Honduras and Nicaragua.
In early March 1990, the two Secretaries General agreed, through
an exchange of notes, on a division of tasks within the framework
of CR. Under the terms of this agreement, the U.N. would assume
responsibility for immobilizing those members of the Nicaraguan re-
sistance found outside of Nicaragua while the OAS would be re-
sponsible for immobilizing the resistance in the Nicaraguan territory.
The OAS also assumed responsibility for assisting and escorting the
families of the Nicaraguan Resistance repatriated by the U.N. from
Honduras and Costa Rica. The military force authorized by the Se-
curity Council would be charged with the reception and custody of
weapons and military material from the resistance out of Nicaragua.
This division of labor between the two organizations resulted from
the fact that the Secretary General of the OAS would not accept that
the U.N. be the operational center of the CR. Such a procedure would
not have been justified given that the Tela agreement had placed the
two Secretary Generals on an equal footing as sole members of the
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CR. The operational phase of the CR-OAS began with the agreement
signed on March 23, 1990 by the then-President Elect of Nicaragua
Madame Chamorro and the Nicaraguan resistance. They agreed on
the process of immobilization including the cessation of military hos-
tilities in Nicaragua. The work of the CR-OAS encompassed a number
of stages, the mobilization and reputation of the resistance as well as
on-going moratorium of guaranteed human and civil rights, programs
for development areas, humanitarian assistance for the resistance and
their families, including food and medical services, and financial aid.
CR-OAS was made up of protection officials, security officers, and
members of the medical and paramedical corps of the Panamerican
Health Organization. The mandate to receive weapons expired on June
29, 1990. At that time the government of Nicaragua requested CR-
OAS continue demobilizing groups of combatants that were still dis-
bursed and in every case the weapons entrusted to CR-OAS were
destroyed by the Nicaraguan army in the presence of members of
CR-OAS staff and witnesses. I do not intend to enter into further
details of the success of the two organizations in a project where the
two Secretaries General shared their responsibilities. The total number
of persons immobilized after July 30, 1990, was 19,720 while the
number of family members declared by the formal combatants totaled
53,349. These figures give us an idea of the dimension of the work
carried out by CR-OAS which continues today. At present, OAS has
in Nicaragua a personnel staff of 80 people who are following up on
the process of resettlement of food, of medical services, etc.
The last aspect I would like to mention in regard to the cooperation
between the two organizations is democracy as a means for peace-
keeping, a new era of cooperation between the OAS and the U.N.
The involvement of international organizations, universal or re-
gional, in electoral processes is not a new thing. Until now, this
observation was mainly on election day. The importance of democracy,
particularly in Central America, for the peace process, started with
the Nicaraguan request to both the U.N. and the OAS to establish
missions to monitor the electoral process. This started even before
the registration of voters. It started when the legislation was being
implemented and adopted. On election day, the 25th of February last
year, there were 433 observers from the Organization of American
States, 215 from the United Nations. They acted independently, but
they coordinated in order to avoid duplication of certain expenses.
This had a tremendous impact because no one expected that this
process would be solved through an electoral process. There was a
similar experience of both organizations acting in a coordnated man-
[Vol. 22:9
INTERNATIONAL USE OF FORCE SYMPOSIUM
ner, but independently, in Haiti. The Secretary General of the OAS
made his first report on the election to be held in March, this month
in San Salvador, which of course faces tremendously difficult prob-
lems.
In all these cases I have mentioned these regional organizations act
directly under the head of the Secretary General. He goes there, he
talks to the people. The United Nations as a much bigger organization
cannot have this sort of communication with the people, with the
political parties, with the government, with the electoral tribunal or
commission responsible in the government for the control of the
election process and this has given tremendous results in the countries
in which it has been established. The OAS members are very sensitive
about the question of nonintervention, but the basis of this intense
active observation of electoral process is based, of course, on the
request and consent of the states; otherwise it would be impossible.
The first stage is to establish, in an agreement with the OAS in
this case, all the privileges and immunities of their service and the
second agreement is made with the agency of the government that
has the task of organizing the electoral process. This second treaty it
is very detailed. All the rights of the members of the observation
mission are detailed, and of course they include things that you could
not imagine, and this has had a very positive result in Latin America.
There is now being organized another observation group for the
elections to be held in Paraguay. The initial request was by the political
parties and then the government acceded to this request, and made
an official request to the Secretary General of the Organization of
American States.
I will finish by saying that the end of the Cold War will facilitate
cooperation of the United Nations and regional arrangement within
their legal spheres of competence. The case of the hostilities between
El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 (the so-called Soccer War) started
after a football match between the national teams of both countries
which fell outside the East/West conflict and proved that the regional
mechanism can indeed work. In this case the organ of consultation
of the OAS succeeded in the suspension of hostilities that the with-
drawal would draw all of the Salvadoran troops occupying Honduran
territory, the exchange of prisoners of war, and in organizing a mission
of military observers to verify compliance with the position taken at
the regional level. In October 1976, both countries agreed to submit
their dispute to mediation.
We hope that a new era of cooperation will begin, wherein the
U.N. and all regional organizations will be able to exercise their
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respective competence in accordance with the original intent of the
founders of the San Francisco Charter.
Thanks.
PROFESSOR WrLNER: Thank you very much indeed. You have given
us much food for thought. As you know in Eastern Europe the
regional arrangement is about to be ended for a particular reason
whereas in other parts of the world such as in Latin America new
emphasis is being given to the system. In another area of the world,
the Middle East, an attempt was made and everyone tried to have a
regional system operational which would have had a universal system.
We do need to focus on all of these while looking at the basic issues
and the basic mechanism of the universal system of the United Nations.
MARCH 2
PANEL II: MEASURES AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL's DISPOSAL
PROFESSOR WILNER: Our first speaker this morning, our major
speaker, is Mr. Nico Schrijver, who is the Legal Officer in the Office
of the Legal Counsel. He works directly with the Under-Secretary
General of the Legal Counsel. He is on leave from his position as
Senior Lecturer in International Law and International Institutions at
the Institute of Social Studies in Hague, in the Netherlands, is a
member of a number of governmental and non-governmental advisory
bodies in the Netherlands, and has published extensively. He is the
co-editor of the volume entitled "The U.N. Under Attack" which
was published in 1988 and co-author of the 1990 Annual Report of
the Academic Council of the United Nations System which is entitled
"Changing Global Needs: Expanding Worlds of the United Nations
System." Mr. Schrijver, whom I will introduce later on, will make
comments and bring some of his expertise on the issue of the concept
of the meaning of sanctions and other measures available to the
Security Council in particular measures short of the use of force.
Mr. Schrijver has, with respect to this crisis, worked directly with
the Legal Counsel on issues of the sanctions and therefore comes to
us with an insider's knowledge and an insider from the viewpoint of
the Secretariat rather than that from any particular national point of
view. And as a former U.N. Secretariat member, I, of course, believe
that the Secretariat has a unique view, and a much more universal
view, with all due respect, than to national delegates and national
experts. So it is with great pleasure that I introduce Mr. Schrijver.
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The Meaning and Operation of Sanctions and Other
Measures Short of the Use of Force
MR. SCHXIVER: - Let me first tell you that although the United
Nations in recent moments has not been very good in respect of the
difference between office hours and free time, I would like to make
it clear that I speak in my personal capacity and that I do not intend
to reflect the views of the Office of Legal Affairs of the U.N.
Secretariat.
The topic is the United Nations and the use of sanctions against
Iraq. Although, as all of us know, after mid-January the sanctions
regime has been supplemented, if not overtaken, by the action stem-
ming from Resolution 678, I believe it is still a very interesting case
to see whether members of the international community are capable
of compelling another member of the family to redress unlawful
conduct and to restore legality.
In the very early morning hours of the 2nd of August 1990, the
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 660, and in the
Resolution the Council unanimously condemns the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. It demanded that Iraq withdraw immediately and uncondi-
tionally all its forces from Kuwait and it called for Iraq and Kuwait
to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their
differences.
Eleven additional resolutions of the Security Council would follow
by which the Council has used, in a very unique way, makeshift parts
of its functions and powers under Chapter 7, the chapter of the
Charter which deals with action with respect to the threats to peace,
breaches of peace, and acts of aggression.
The twelve resolutions of the Security Council have been widely
supported by the 15 member Council: 5 out of 12 were unanimously
adopted, 2 with 14 votes in favor, 4 with 13 votes in favor, and 1
with 12 votes in favor (Resolution 678, which also got one abstention
from China and two votes against by Yemen and Cuba).
On the 6th of August, only four days after the adoption of Res-
olution 660, the Security Council determined that Iraq had failed to
comply with the demands of Resolution 660, to withdraw immediately
and unconditionally its forces from Kuwait and thereupon the Council
decided to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Iraq
and against occupied Kuwait.
First, I would like to review the concept of sanctions and I would
like to discuss some precedents of past collective economic sanctions.
Second, I would like to discuss some major legal aspects of the
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sanctions regime including the scope of the sanction resolutions and
the objectives pursued by them. I will dwell a bit on the work of the
Sanctions Committee of the Security Council and I will say a few
words about the implementation mechanism of the sanctions.
But first, a few words on the concepts and functions of collective
sanctions. The use of economic sanctions to achieve political ends is
of course not at all new. Throughout history states and regional
institutions have regularly resorted to economic sanctions for a very
wide variety of objectives. We have an ample practice of unilateral
sanctions, reprisals, counter measures, retortions, etc. in international
relations. I think, for instance, about the sanctions of the members
of the OECD against the Soviet Union after the invasion of Af-
ghanistan. I think about the sanctions in the trade relationships be-
tween the United States and European Communities, the so-called
Spaghetti Wars, or Pork Wars, etc., all of them examples of unilateral
sanctions. Relatively new, however, in international relations is the
concept of collective sanctions-by which for purposes of this pres-
entation, I refer to collective measures imposed by organs representing
the international community in response to unlawful conduct by one
of its members and meant to uphold standards of behavior required
by international law. This concept of collective sanctions is closely
linked to schemes for collective security as well as to issues of en-
forcement of international law. As such, the very topic of collective
sanctions lies at the heart of the debate of the effectiveness of the
United Nations system and the effectiveness of international law.
However, there is a very limited practice of collected international
sanctions which I will refer to later.
Sanctions can be adopted to serve a variety of functions. Maybe
you can compare it with the function of punishments in national
criminal law and then you can also distinguish various functions of
punishment in comparison also for sanctions.
First, sanctions can serve as a means of expressing condemnation
of certain conduct which has been perceived by a majority of the
international community as unlawful. Second, sanctions can serve as
a kind of punishment and retaliation for unlawful behavior. And
third, sanctions can be serve as a method of compellence or persuasion
to change policy, and if there is the option to widen the scope of
the sanctions they can also perform the additional function of deter-
rence.
As I already stated, there is a limited practice of collected economic
sanctions. In fact, in a Covenant in the League of Nations there was
an article, Article 16, which related to collective measures of an
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economic and military nature. In case any member of the League
would resort to war in violation of its international law obligations,
then the aggressive state, according to Article 16, would among others
automatically be subjected to the severance of all trade or financial
relations.
This Article has been applied only once, in 1935, when the League
imposed sanctions against Italy because of its unlawful invasion and
occupation of Ethiopia in 1935. These sanctions included an arms
embargo, financial embargo, an embargo on the exportation of news
(you were living in another era in those days), and an embargo on
important minerals, but excluding oil. These sanctions have never been
very effective and it was partly due to the fact that there was no
centralized system of supervising monetary sanctions and that the
members of the League were in fact free to decide for themselves
which, if any or all, measures they would take.
The Charter of the United Nations, built on the lessons of the
League of Nations period, elaborated on Article 16 of the League's
Covenant and provided a more elaborate and centralized system of
collective sanctions in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 deals with threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, and is central
to the functions and powers of the Security Council. In order to be
able to take measures in Chapter 7, in order to "open the door" to
decide on the use of sanctions, the Security Council is required under
Article 39 of the Charter to determine whether there is a threat to
the peace or breach of the peace or act of aggression. And once the
Security Council has made such a determination, has used one of the
three keys indicated in Article 39 to open the door to Chapter 7, then
it has the competence first to call upon the parties to comply with
certain provisional measures-that is Article 40; second, it can make
certain recommendations-Article 39; third, it can decide on the em-
ployment of measures not involving the use of armed forces-Article
41; and fourth, it can commence or recommend measures involving
the use of armed force.
Please note that the Security Council is free to combine any of
these possibilities as circumstances require and also the Council is free
to commence or to recommend such measures under Chapter 7. All
members have bound themselves, by ratifying the United Nations
Charter, to accept and to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council, and in this way the drafters of the Charter and the member
states of the United Nations have gone far beyond the system estab-
lished under the League of Nations.
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This is, in a nutshell, the constitutional framework within which
the Security Council has taken action with respect to the breach of
the peace which occurred on the 2nd of August 1990.
Let me just briefly review a few examples of the practice of the
Security Council under Chapter 7 with respect to collective economic
sanctions. In debates of the Security Council, there have been frequent
speculations throughout the decades about imposing economic sanc-
tions: among others against Spain in 1946; against South Africa in
1949 and ever since it practiced an apartheid policy; and against
Belgium in 1969 during the Congo crisis; against Portugal in 1963
because of its refusal to grant independence to its colonies in Africa.
It was, however, only in 1966 that the Security Council used for the
first time its power under Article 41, the article dealing with economic
sanction, when it recommended first an oil embargo and then eight
months later further reaching economic sanctions against the illegal
minority regime in Rhodesia. In 1968 the Security Council finally
launched a full-fledged financial embargo against Rhodesia with ex-
ceptions provided for medical supplies and educational materials. The
sanctions were maintained up to 1979 and then the Lancaster House
Agreement impelled the long awaited independence of Zimbabwe on
the basis of black majority rule. The second relevant example is the
arms embargo against South Africa which was imposed in 1977 because
the Council determined that the acquisition by South Africa of arms
and related military material could constitute a threat to the main-
tenance of international peace and security. This mandatory arms
embargo imposed on all states is in place to the present day.
What about the sanctions against Iraq and occupied Kuwait? Now,
without going too deep in all kinds of details, it can be concluded
that the Security Council has placed its actions regarding the situation
between Iraq and Kuwait (as the item is sometimes called in the United
Nations) squarely within Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter
and that it has followed the logical order of Chapter 7 as I have just
outlined to you. With the duration of the conflict, the Council has
made use of its powers in a step-by-step and ascending way as provided
in the U.N. Charter.
If you look at the Resolutions you will notice that as early as the
2nd of August, 1990, the Security Council immediately opened the
door of Chapter 7 by the determination that there was a breach of
the peace. So the Council starts in Chapter 7 and stays with its actions
under that Chapter, but now we had as from the early hours of the
crisis only the determination of the Security Council under Article 39
of Chapter 7 that there was a breach of the peace. And it demanded
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under Article 40 the immediate withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and
called as provisional measures for the two countries to begin imme-
diately its terms of negotiations.
As discussed before, only four days later the Security Council,
deeply concerned that Iraq had failed to implement Resolution 660,
decided to impose a comprehensive package of economic sanctions
against Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Resolution 661 was a financial and
trade embargo. And then Iraq continued to fail to comply with
Resolution 660 and economic sanctions were complemented and refined
as a means of additional compellence and deterrence. For example,
Resolution 665 adopted on 25 August 1990, provided for the en-
forcement at sea of the trade embargo. Resolution 666 related to the
delivery of medical supplies and, in human care and circumstances,
food stuffs. Resolution 670 confirms that the economic sanctions
imposed under Resolution 661 applied to all means of transport,
including air, so this resolution is known as the Air Embargo Res-
olution. Finally on 29 October, 1990, Resolution 674 was adopted,
providing that Iraq would be liable for any loss, damage, or injury
arising in regards to Kuwait, third states, states and their nationals
and companies. But the major sanction Resolutions are 661 and 670
which relate to the air embargo.
What were the objectives pursued by the Security Council in the
sanctions resolutions? Well in fact they are very clearly indicated in
the relevant Security Council Resolutions and include: first, to bring
the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end; second,
to restore the sovereignty, the independence, and territorial integrity
of Kuwait; and third (and this was added later in Resolution 662) to
restore the authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait.
So sanctions were not so much intended to punish or to repress
Iraq, but rather to coerce it into putting an end to its unlawful
occupation and purported annexation of Kuwait. In other words,
collective measures were as a means of compelling a state to redress
an international wrongful act and to restore legality.
What is the scope of these sanctions? To what kind of trade and
economic relationship do they apply? Resolution 661 provides for a
very comprehensive package of economic and financial measures in-
cluding: first, the prohibition of the import of all commodity products
originating in Iraq and Kuwait; second, the prohibition of the sale
or supply of any commodities or products including weapons to any
person or body in Iraq or Kuwait (basically an export embargo); third,
the prohibition of any activities by nationals of states which would
promote or was calculated to promote the export or transmission of
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shipments of commodities or products from or to Iraq or Kuwait;
and fourth, the prohibition of any transfer of funds or other financial
or economic resources to Iraq or occupied Kuwait.
States were called upon to comply with the sanctions, notwithstand-
ing any contract entered into or licenses granted before the 6th of
August. So you could say that the sanctions to a certain extent had
some retroactive character. Now, as I told you the sanctions are
complemented and refined in subsequent resolutions, but basically the
661 trade and economic sanctions and the 670 air embargo resolutions
are the main and major resolutions in this field. Exceptions to the
sanctions are indicated for the delivery and the payment for medical
supplies and also, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.
To whom are these sanctions resolutions addressed? Well if you
read through these sanctions resolutions you will see that they are
addressed to all states, including member states and non-member states
of the United Nations, such as Switzerland. The sanctions resolutions
contain ample references to such phrases as "all states shall prevent,"
"all states shall not make available," "calls upon all states," "de-
mands that all states prevent the nationals from" doing this or that.
So this implies that the primary responsibility for the implementation
of the sanctions rests with states and that they are obliged to introduce
the sanctions in their national legislation and domestic league of order
for which unfortunately no uniform practice exists.
Soon after the adoption of the trade embargo, a question arose-
what would be the effect of these sanctions on the activities of the
United Nations itself and the activities of UNP or the activities of
other international organizations such as the World Bank or the
International Monetary Fund relating to Iraq and occupied Kuwait?
In view of Article 48, Paragraph 2 of the Charter, and in view of
the relationships agreements between the United Nations and the
various specialized agencies, by which all have become members of
the United Nations family (the relationship agreement for instance of
the food and agricultural organization, and U.N. agreement of the
IMF or UNESCO and the United Nations), it seems obvious that
those activities which were export or import related activities-for
instance of the World Bank financing the improvements of the in-
frastructure in Iraq in order to promote its export capabilities-would
be covered by the sanctions. Not only states but also international
economic institutions would be bound by the sanctions resolutions
and indeed in Resolution 670 the air embargo resolution-which is
in a way is an omnibus resolution, because the Council took the
freedom to arrange a few methods in this resolution as well-the
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Council affirmed that the "United Nations organizations, its spe-
cialized agencies, and other international organizations [such as the
European Community for instance] are required to take such measures
as may be necessary to keep in effect the sanctions."
Now, I would like to tell you something about the Sanctions Com-
mittee. As in cases of sanctions against Rhodesia and against South
Africa, the Security Council decided to establish a committee consisting
of all the members of the Security Council who deal with the sanctions.
The committee is commonly known as the Sanctions Committee.
Ambassador Kirsch served as its Vice Chairman in 1990. The Sanctions
Committee decided that it would take its decisions by consensus and
I can reveal to you that that proved not always to be easy.
The original mandate of the Sanctions Committee as you can find
in Resolution 661 includes: first, to examine the progress reports
submitted by the Secretary General on the implementation of the
sanctions resolution; second, to seek from all states further information
regarding action taken by them concerning the effective implemen-
tation of the sanctions. In later resolutions the mandates of the
Sanctions Committee has been somewhat widened. For instance, in
Resolution 666 which relates to the exception clause relating to the
delivery of food supplies, and humanitarian circumstances, the Security
Council decided that the Sanctions Committee also shall have the task
of keeping the food situation in Iraq and Kuwait under constant
review in order "to make the necessary determination that there are
not humanitarian circumstances which have arisen in which there
would be an urgent humanitarian need to supply food stuffs to Iraq
and Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering."
Under Resolution 669, the Committee received the additional task
of dealing with the requests of member states of the United Nations
which experienced "special economic problems" referred to in Article
50 of the Charter arising from carrying out of the sanctions, and the
Committee was asked to make appropriate recommendations to the
President of the Security Council in this respect.
Finally, the Council allocated the Sanctions Committee with some
specific responsibilities as regards the air embargo, apart from mon-
itoring the air traffic from and to Iraq and Kuwait. These new
functions of the Committee specifically included the competence to
approve particular flights to and from Iraq or Kuwait, such as those
for the purposes of evacuating foreign nationals from Iraq or Kuwait
or providing food supplies to certain communities in Iraq to certain
foreign communities in Iraq or Kuwait. And the approval of the
Committee would mean that the aircraft in question is not to land
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in overflight countries nor to allow inspection as was provided in
another paragraph of the Resolution.
How has the implementation of the superficial machinery of the
sanctions been organized? First, states have frequently reported, as
requested under the relevant Security Council Resolutions, to the
United Nations on the way they are carrying out these sanctions. In
addition, the Secretary General has also sent notes to all states in-
forming them of their obligations under the relevant Security Council
resolutions requesting them to send information on the actions they
have taken at the domestic level to implement the sanctions. There
was for instance a questionnaire and there was a rather good response
to it by 15 January 1991; 96 states out of 159 member states had
sent in rather extensive replies to the questionnaire and that is in
comparison with other questionnaires for the United Nations-not a
bad score at all. So the responsibility for the implementation rests
with states but they have to report to the United Nations on what
they have done at the domestic level.
Secondly, third state participation is foreseen in monetary compli-
ance and if necessary enforcement of the sanctions. For example,
through Resolution 665 in late August, 1990, the Security Council
called upon those member states cooperating with the government of
Kuwait who were deploying maritime forces to the area to halt all
inward and outward maritime shipping in the area in order to inspect
and verify the cargoes and destinations and if necessary they had the
right to use limited force to stop and inspect the ships. These were
the major ways in which the implementation machinery of the sanctions
has been organized but I must note that basically the primary re-
sponsibility rests with states themselves.
Now I would like to mention three main problems which arose in
the Sanctions Committee concerning the implementation of the sanc-
tions resolutions. The first issue relates to the provision and distri-
bution of food supplies to Kuwait and Iraq. The effects of the
sanctions, and also the effects of the discriminatory Iraqi food policy
in the first few months, on the food and health situation of foreign
nationals who were stranded in Iraq or Kuwait were a major concern
to the Security Council and its Sanctions Committee. Now, apart
from diplomatic personnel, technical experts, consultants, and business
people, the foreign nationals included in particular hundreds of thou-
sands of migrant laborers, mainly from Southeast Asian countries and
from other Arab states. On the basis of the exception clause relating
to food supplies, some homesteads requested the Sanctions Commit-
tee's authorization to ship food to their nationals, and this has time
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and again given rise to difficult debates in the United Nations as to
how to assess the situation in Iraq and Kuwait and as to how to
prevent the food supplies, if authorized by the Sanctions Committee,
from falling into the hands of the Iraqi Army.
In Resolution 666, adopted in September 1990, the Security Council
has elaborated on the exception clause for food and medical supplies.
The Council decided to allocate to the Sanctions Committee certain
tasks in the field of the assessment of whether there were humanitarian
needs to supply foodstuffs to Iraq and Kuwait. The Resolution pro-
vides for three stages. First, the Committee has the task of keeping
the food situation in Iraq and Kuwait under constant review, using
information provided by the Secretary General of the United Nations
and by other humanitarian agencies. It was not very easy, for the
international organizations are hardly represented any longer in Iraq
and Kuwait, and it was also very difficult in view of the refusal of
Iraq to cooperate with the United Nations, for instance its refusal to
receive missions of the United Nations to assess the food and health
situations. So the first stage under 666 was collection of information
concerning the actual food and health situation in Iraq and Kuwait.
Second, on the basis of that recommendation, the Committee had
the function to determine whether or not circumstances have arisen
in which there would be an urgent humanitarian need, as stated in
the Resolution, to supply foodstuffs to Iraq and Kuwait in order to
relieve human suffering. And if the Committee identified such hu-
manitarian circumstances, then it had to formulate certain decisions,
certain modalities on how to provide the foodstuffs and how to
supervise the distribution of the foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait with
the United Nations in cooperation with the International Committee
of the Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies.
Well, as I told you already, this task has been far from an easy
one. At this very moment people from UNICEF and WHO are working
very hard on the first substantive reports to be issued on the food
and health situation in Iraq and Kuwait. Only last week Iraq allowed
(for the first time) the mission of an international organization to
assess the food situation over there and we hope to deal with it in
a very intensive way in the days to come. There have been so far
only two cases in which the Committee has authorized shipments of
food to Iraq and Kuwait, and those shipments were accompanied by
officials of the National Red Cross Societies of the countries in
question, who also supervised in cooperation with their embassies in
Baghdad the distribution of the foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait in
order to make sure they would reach the intended beneficiaries.
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The second difficult issue is certainly not an absolute one and is
in principal only cargo related. In general, flights to or from Iraq
and Kuwait which do not engage in activities contrary to the trade
embargo are allowed. Apart from that the air embargo resolution
itself identifies three particular categories of flights which do not fall
under the air embargo: first, flights for shipments of medical supplies
and (if authorized by the Committee on humanitarian circumstances)
for the provision of foodstuffs; second, particular flights approved
by the Committee, for example for the purpose of evacuating foreign
nationals or for the purpose of VIP flights, diplomatic consultations;
and third, flights certified by the United Nations as solely for the
purpose of the U.N. Observer mission between Iraq and Iran. Between
25 September, 1990, (the date of the adoption of the Resolution in
question) and 15 January, 1991, the Committee dealt with about 198
flights to and from Iraq and Kuwait and as regards the approval of
the particular flights a very interesting practice emerged. If the Com-
mittee approved a particular flight it often stipulated that the aircraft
in question should be inspected before departure to and upon arrival
from Baghdad by the customs authorities of the countries where the
flight originated or the countries of destination, and it stipulated that
this inspection should be carried out in the presence of representatives
of the United Nations or an appropriate international humanitarian
agency (such as, for instance, the International Organization for Mi-
gration or the Red Cross) and in this way a kind of international
surveillance of the inspection of the aircraft in question evolved.
The third and last major item which I would like to mention in
the work of the Sanctions Committee relates to the so-called special
economic problems for third countries resulting from these sanctions.
There is a Charter Article, (not very well known) that is Article 50,
which provides that if the Council has taken enforcement measures
against any state, then any other state, whether a member of the
United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special
economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures
shall have the right to consult with the Security Council with regard
to a solution to these problems.
Such an Article was not included. I cannot find it in the League
of Nations covenant and in a way this reflects emerging principles of
modern international law relating to incredible sharing of the burdens.
There is, however, only a very limited practice of the Security Council
under this Charter Article which in the past has only been invoked
by some African countries during the Rhodesia sanctions: among
others by Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana. During the Persian
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Gulf crisis it soon became obvious that the whole network of trade,
financial, and also human relationships became seriously affected as
a result of the sanctions. One should make, however, a distinction
between special economic problems directly arising from the carrying
out of the sanctions to which Article 50 refers, and those more
indirectly resulting from the international crisis such as the impact of
the sudden rise of oil prices, lost business opportunities, and stop of
aid and stop of flow of oil at concessional prices from Iraq or Kuwait,
etc. These problems are very serious problems, especially to oil im-
porting African countries, but these problems were, however, not
within the scope of Article 50 of the U.N. Charter.
It is no wonder that a large number of countries have invoked
during this particular crisis Article 50. So far, twenty-one countries
sent in applications to the Security Council under Article 50, and
(roughly speaking) these countries consist of three groups: first, the
neighboring countries of Iraq and Kuwait and the neighboring coun-
tries with very close economic relations with Iraq and Kuwait such
as Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen; second, Asian states with many
migrant laborers in the Gulf regions whose economies are very de-
pendent on the remittances sent by their migrant laborers in Iraq and
Kuwait-this group includes such countries as Sri Lanka, India, Viet-
nam, the Philippines, and Bangladesh; third, countries with rather
strong economic and political relationships with Iraq such as the North
African states of Syria, Tunisia, or some eastern European states such
as Bulgaria and Rumania.
The Sanctions Committee decided to establish a working group to
examine the requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50
of the Charter and to make appropriate recommendations to the
President of the Security Council. And from November on, the work-
ing group completed a series of meetings during which the represen-
tatives of these twenty-one countries were heard and during which
special economic problems were identified. The main problems in-
cluded losses resulting from undelivered products to the Gulf area,
undelivered oil shipments from Iraq and Kuwait, and costs associated
with the reappropriation and rehabilitation of the nationals returning
from Iraq and Kuwait. The working group has made a series of
recommendations to the President of the Security Council, among
others to appeal to all states on an urgent basis to provide immediate
technical and financial assistance to the countries concerned and also
to invite international organizations and development institutions such
as the IMF, the World Bank, the FAO, etc. to refuel and to upgrade
their persistent assistance programs with these countries, And of course
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in the United Nations we sincerely hope that this will work out
satisfactorily. However, the U.N. is not in a position to establish a
compensatory program or fund for these countries because basically
Article 50 is only a kind of consultation machinery.
I would like to conclude with some observations. I hope I have
given you a relevant bird's eye view of the Security Council action
with respect to the crisis in the Persian Gulf and also of the major
problems involved in the implementation of the sanctions resolutions.
As I told you the Security Council in my view has logically acted
within the constitutional framework provided for in Chapter 7 of the
Charter following the general scheme of measures indicated and also
the descending order of the measures.
The sanctions resolutions include the comprehensive package of
financial and economic measures as well as cargo related air embargo.
The primary responsibility for their enforcement lies with states as
long as the international enforcement machinery at the international
level is in such a primitive stage apart from states. Also the United
Nations organizations, specialized agencies, and other international
organizations are required to implement the sanctions and enforce the
sanctions. The United Nations can only play a role in monitoring and
appraising the implementation of the sanctions. The United Nations
had to face very difficult problems with regard to the implementation
of sanctions against Iraq and occupied Kuwait, in particular concerning
the provision and distribution of food supplies to people in Iraq and
Kuwait and also difficult problems with respect to evacuation flights
and also the very difficult problems relating to the special economic
problems of states arising from carrying out of these measures.
It is obvious from this experience that in today's interdependent
world, effective sanctions (and I believe the sanctions against Iraq
have been rather effective and in the case reported yesterday com-
pliance has been overall very good) cut deep, probably much deeper
than foreseen in 1945 at the time of the drafting of the Charter in
all kinds of trade, financial and human relationships. On one hand,
the founding fathers of the United Nations Charter foresaw that such
a situation would call for an equitable sharing of the burden both
politically (Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter) and economically (Article
50, which relates to the special economic problems). However, I guess
that in 1945 one did not and could not foresee that our world would
become so interdependent that the imposition of sanctions against one
or two particular countries could result in a mass migration of people
and would result in so many unintended shifts in trade and financial
flows involving many countries; some countries benefit and also a
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large number of countries suffer. If the international community would
like to maintain the imposition of collective economic sanctions as a
major weapon to combat an aggressor, then it is my personal view
that a rethinking of these side effects should occur, since as Ambas-
sador Kirsch also put it yesterday, it proved to be a double-edged
sword.
Although all of us know that the sanctions have been overtaken
by the action based on Resolution 678, I hope a review of the sanction
resolutions and the review of the work of the Sanctions Committee
has been an interesting case study for you and I hope you can learn
from it in which way members of the international community, by
applying collective measures short of the use of armed forces, can
peacefully impel a state to redress unlawful conduct and to induce it
to live up to its international obligations. Thank you.
PROFESSOR WILNER: Thank you very much, Mr. Schrijver. This is
a comprehensive and quite brilliant review of the use of sanctions in
particular and in general in the history of the use of sanctions.
Mr. David Scheffer is a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace where he spends his time analyzing develop-
ments in international and national security law. He is a graduate of
Harvard and has law degrees from Oxford and Georgetown. He is a
member of the New York Bar, D.C. Bar, practiced law in Singapore,
then served as Counsel on Foreign Relations International Affairs
Fellow and served a year with the Arms Control in International
Security and Science Subcommittee, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the U.S. House of Representatives. In 1987 he joined the profes-
sional staff of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and worked on legal
aspects for powers, arms control, arms exports, intelligence foresight
and anti-terrorism and became a member of the staff of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace on February 1, 1989. He is pub-
lished widely on International legal and political subjects as well as
U.S. legal affairs. He is a contributing author of a book called Right
Versus Might: International Law and the Use of Force. His recent
article entitled, "Limited Collective Security" appears in the Fall 1990
issue of Foreign Policy. His occasional papers in United Nations in
the Gulf Crisis and options for U.S. policy and roles for the United
Nations after the Gulf War were published by the U.N. association
for the United States. A forthcoming book Mr. Scheffer is co-editing
will examine international law and the use of force after the Cold
War.
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Mr. Scheffer will comment on the presentation made by Mr. Schrijver
and particularly on the use of sanctions beyond and after force has
been used for compliance purposes.
MR. SCHEFFER: It is a great pleasure to be here in Georgia. And
it is a pleasure to be pinch-hitting here because what we just heard
in Mr. Schrijver's paper was really, I have to repeat the word, a
brilliant overview. For someone who spends a lot of time each day
monitoring and analyzing what has been going on at the U.N. and
in the Gulf over the last seven months, you just received a lot of
hard information from one of the sources within the actual workings
of the U.N. and I am looking forward to seeing his paper published.
My commentary is going to veer off into some additional points that
I hope will elaborate some critical sanction issues that have been
briefly touched upon by Mr. Schrijver and maybe we can launch into
a little bit of the controversial elements of a few of them, and also
prospects for the future.
Let me just begin by making one short observation about the
transition from economic sanctions to military action under the U.N.
Charter in this crisis, for those of us who were deeply involved in
following this during the weeks and months after the invasion, there
was one issue that kept coming up in public discourse; it was a general
conception that during the early months of the Iraq/Kuwait crisis,
trade sanctions must be proven to have failed before the Security
Council could authorize the use of force under Article 42 of the
Charter. In other words, economic collapse first, use of force last.
However, the text of Article 42 offers more latitude. It states
"should the Security Council consider the measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it
may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security." The Security
Council could make a determination at any time that trade sanctions
would "be inadequate" and then move on to Article 42 and the use
of force. Iraq, for example, was not driven to economic collapse,
which could have taken years, before the Council by adopting Res-
olution 678 concluded that economic sanctions were not achieving the
objective of forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The Security
Council decision reflected a judgment, particularly by the Bush Ad-
ministration, both that the economic sanctions had proved to be
inadequate up to that date of the Council action, and would be
inadequate at least in the event Iraq continued the policy of non-
compliance following the deadline of January 15, 1991, established
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in Resolution 678. So although in retrospect now everything seems
to have followed logically one after the other, at the time, just a few
months ago, there were a lot of people talking about the necessity
to keep sanctions in place until certain events had occurred as a
consequence of those sanctions before moving on to force. And my
point here is simply that the Charter is more flexible. The Security
Council can make the determination that those sanctions would be
inadequate and then move on to the use of force. It is a judgment
call depending on the circumstances of the crisis, but that is an
important point to stress for future application of economic sanctions.
However, it leads me to what I think is a significant point, because
of the perceptions that will arise from this entire conflict. I even heard
this point made yesterday by the British Permanent Representative to
the Security Council, who referred essentially to the fact that sanctions
did not work here. Well, I would argue that the story is not yet in
on whether or not economic sanctions worked. In other words, we
will know at some point in the future to what extent the economic
sanctions weakened the Iraqi army so that it became obviously a very
weakened fighting force once the U.N. authorized forces went into
Kuwait and Iraq. We seem to be under an impression now that it
was the bombing campaign and then the massive use of force in the
ground attack that really crippled that army into submission, but I
submit that at some point in the future we will learn to what extent
these sanctions had an impact on weakening the military capability
of the Iraqi army and therefore when we have situations in the future,
it will be important not to jump first to Article 42 and the use of
force because we saw it work in the Persian Gulf crisis, but rather
to remember that there are some procedures set forth in Chapter 7
to apply nonmilitary efforts first and that those nonmilitary efforts,
even if they prove not to succeed in ensuring compliance by the
violating state, the Security Council Resolutions involving economic
sanctions and arms embargoes can have a tremendous impact and
effect upon the fighting capability of that violating nation's army.
We still need to await the real evidence of that, but I think we must
keep that strongly in mind. I am almost not inclined to say this yet,
but at some point it may well be true that you could say that not
just the bombing and the actual use of force won this, but that
sanctions also won this war and we will just have to see how that
plays out. But it does also raise these judgment calls that Mr. Schrijver
so competently described to us, that there is a downside-the impact
on the civilian population. That is why the establishment of a Sanctions
Committee under the auspices of the Security Council was a critical
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and historic event here because they are responsible for monitoring
what is going on with the sanctions, what is the impact, both within
and outside of Iraq, in other nations which are filing applications
under Article 50.
Let me also mention that we have a novel aspect with respect to
the sanctions that were imposed during the last seven months. A lot
of those sanctions were imposed to protect the assets of Kuwait, not
to prevent a country from ultimate access to those assets, but rather
to ensure that an aggressor nation does not seize control of the assets
of a legitimate government of a nation. That, unless I stand corrected,
I think is a novel development in U.N. practice and it also led to a
tremendous complex of issues for lawyers around the world, and that
story has yet to be written. In particular, I understand that it took
months for the U.S. government just to draft the regulations on the
frozen assets of Iraq and Kuwait so that U.S. lawyers would have
clear guidance on how to advise their clients with respect to those
particular assets. And what made it so complicated was the fact that
we were protecting Kuwaiti assets and we had to provide ways and
exemptions for access to those assets.
This leads me into the whole issue of the frozen asset problem for
the future. This was an ad hoc operation, both militarily (even though
it was under U.N. authorization), but also in many respects with the
sanctions. And by that I really mean focusing on frozen assets. The
Security Council essentially said, "Okay everyone, freeze. Freeze what
you have. Don't let it go, but you figure out how to do it and you
enforce it." And that meant that in every legal jurisdiction around
the world, people had to come up with their own ways of implementing
this under law, and even though they could do so with the instruction
and authorization of the United Nations, and that greased the wheels,
the point is that national laws have to be effected to really make this
work.
It leads one to wonder and wonder very seriously about the de-
velopment in the future of an international convention or international
procedures of some sort that could be invoked when sanctions are
imposed and enforced by U.N. Security Council; in other words, clear-
cut streamlined procedures that all nations are obligated to implement
upon a decision by the Security Council to impose sanctions on a
particular nation state and in particular to freeze the overseas assets
of that state. And I might suggest in a law school forum, that it is
exactly the kind of issue that beckons an academic exercise of analysis
in a law journal or in a special conference just to try to bring together
the whole complex of issues of private law as well as public law that
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have to be dealt with to implement a Security Council direction to
freeze assets and to impose a massive trade embargo on a particular
nation. And that might help to deal with some of the Article 50
problems of hardship as well.
Let me comment on the continuation of sanctions after this conflict.
That is obviously the issue that is before the Security Council today
and let me just check off the obvious for you, that there is going to
be a further Security Council decision now on what the future character
of sanctions will be against Iraq. First, the Security Council has to
have something to say, with respect to lifting the sanctions on Kuwait
and the unfreezing on Kuwaiti assets. Just to clean that aspect of the
prior resolutions up there is going to have to be some kind of detailed
statement by the Security Council that will authorize nations to lift
sanctions from liberated Kuwait and on the assets of liberated Kuwait.
So that is one issue that we are going to see the Security Council
dealing with.
Second, is the scope of sanctions that will continue to be employed
against Iraq-and this is really an issue of leverage-but it is still
something the Security Council will have to grapple with. Some of
the things that you would assume would continue in place would be
an embargo on military items and certain highly sensitive industrial
and manufactured goods, the type of dual-use technology that we
refer to in U.S. law where a commercial item could also be used for
military purposes. You will also be thinking, I assume, at the U.N.
of technology related to the manufacture of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons or any type of ballistic or cruise missiles. Those
will want to be frozen out of Iraq. The Sanctions Committee will
have to monitor the continuation of sanctions not only in Iraq but
any kind of trade or arms control regime that may evolve in the
Middle East as well as monitoring and oversight of the trade sanctions.
But without being in that forum today, it is hard to know precisely
where these issues are leading in the Security Council, but I think as
lawyers we can assume that there is going to be some legal framework
for a continuation of sanctions. A lot of it is, of course, going to
depend on the continuation of the Saddam government, and the
Revolutionary Command Council if a more enlightened Iraqi comes
to power, then once again you will see the situation probably change
within the Security Council.
I think on the issue of sanctions themselves, that more or less does
it except for one thing. On the whole issue of reparation, which the
Security Council is also grappling with, it is going to be interesting
to see how that issue intersects with sanctions, because the whole
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reparations issue is a mine field in and of itself. The dollar amounts
you are probably familiar with, upwards of $100 billion damage in
Kuwait, may eventually be lodged as claims. There will be claims by
Israel, by Saudi Arabia, by U.S. companies, and also there will be
claims even by the U.N. itself, which has incurred a tremendous
amount of cost in this entire engagement. That would be a very dicey
issue but nonetheless the claims can certainly be filed by international
organizations. There is nothing conceptually preventing that.
Nonetheless, if you have a very strict sanctions regimen imposed
and continued to be imposed upon Iraq, it is going to hobble the
ability of that government to raise the necessary revenue and to rebuild
its industrial base to pay reparations, much less rebuild the country
itself. If, for example, frozen assets of Iraq are applied toward rep-
arations, that will be a loss of I believe $6-9 billion in frozen assets
overseas (I am not sure of the precise figure-maybe it is just $3 or
$4 billion). But relatively speaking to the cost, it is a small amount
of money overseas. But also the whole idea of garnishing the oil
export revenue of Iraq in order to pay for some of the reparations
is another critical issue and how that plays into the sort of punitive
imposition of sanctions in the future, especially if Saddam remains
in power, is going to present very complex, difficult decisions for the
Security Council to make. It will be those decisions that will be
facilitated if there is a new government in Iraq, because I think then
the Security Council might view the situation with a higher degree of
forgiveness and perhaps a greater relaxation of sanctions and some
kind of deal struck on reparations. In fact, as lawyers you probably
want to start thinking of this more in bankruptcy terms, you know
$.30 on the dollar, or $.40 on the dollar, required of Iraq as opposed
to 100 percent compensation. Because, frankly, the figures are stag-
gering and remember that Iraq has upwards of $90 billion in foreign
debt still outstanding to Arab nations, to the Soviet Union, to Eastern
Europe and to Western banks and governments. So it is an enormous
cost and those kinds of issues I wager the Sanctions Committee will
probably continue to find themselves involved with.
PROFESSOR WILNER: We obviously can glean from the discussion
thus far the fact that first in this particular situation mechanisms were
set in place to define how the sanctions which have been imposed
would in fact be implemented and the limits to the implementation.
I think this is an important creation of the sanctions and of course
of their use. And as our crystal gazer has now just told us, their
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continued and perhaps permanent use is an important point for us
to have to bear in mind.
The other point is that when we do talk about sanctions, economic
sanctions you think about immediately, but there are obviously other
sanctions possible and in use, that is, those not necessarily relating
to economic constraints but those which deal with military constraints
or financial constraints. And I suppose it would be reasonable to
think that the concept of sanctions and other measures short of the
use of force can really be a panoply of types of constraints which
would fit a particular situation. Of course we see that these sanctions,
as Mr. Schrijver has made very clear, also relate not only to a situation
of aggression but to other breaches of the peace and to other situations
which would lead to breaches of the peace. In the past much of the
response was to colonial situations. I think that perhaps ought to also
be borne in mind.
And then finally it would seem that we also ought to think in terms
of the possibility on the one hand of immediate measures, measures
that will have an immediate effect, and then of longer-term measures.
On the one hand you use certain economic sanctions in the present
situation to bring about an end to the aggression, but on the other
hand, then it is also important to talk about sanctions beyond the
end of aggression. In this case one may want to think in terms of
the use of sanctions or other measures to maintain the peace after
peace has been re-established-in this case, the use of the embargo
of certain types of arms or certain products susceptible to being used
in an aggressive fashion.
PANEL III: APPLICATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEASURES IN THE
PERSIAN GULF CRISIS AND OTHER CURRENT AND FUTURE CRISES
PROFESSOR SOHN: Our last panel will first continue to discuss the
question of application of the Security Council measures in the Persian
Gulf crisis and in the second half will deal also with other current
and future international crises.
Our first speaker this afternoon is Mr. David Scheffer, who was
introduced already this morning by Professor Wilner. I just want to
add one comment, which might not surprise you, namely that Mr.
Scheffer is also a very good writer on current affairs. I appreciate
what Mr. Scheffer is doing in keeping me informed, and now he is
going to tell us a bit further about what we discussed this morning
and how far out we are going from there into the future.
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The Persian Gulf Crisis
MR. SCHEFMER: I am going to talk about the Persian Gulf and
collective security. I will jump around a little bit.
Elihu Root, who represented New York in the New York Senate
and who is one of the great international lawyers of the 20th Century,
also the first President of the Carnegie Endowment, wryly noted once
that "the people of the State of New York are in favor of Prohibition
but against the application of it." When one considers Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter and the debate over its application during the
Kuwait crisis, a similar observation would be warranted. Governments
are quick to favor the principles of Chapter VIlbut have a harder
time supporting the application of them.
Much of the debate centered on how to harmonize collective self-
defense with collective security. The Security Council did not deny
the relative parties in the Kuwait dispute the inherent right of self-
defense. Of the twelve Security Council Resolutions on Iraq adopted
in 1990, the only explicit reference to self-defense appears in one of
the preambular provisions of Resolution 661, and even there the
Council affirms the right "in accordance of Article 51 of the Charter."
That sole reference reflects a consensus about the continued existence
of an inherent right of self-defense that can be exercised in accordance
with the procedures set forth in Article 51.
The question with regard to the Kuwait crisis was whether the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense could be imple-
mented at any time without the participation of the Security Council.
The language of the twelve resolutions including Resolution 661 would
have been rendered nonsensical if the legal principle of self-defense
could have been invoked unilaterally at any time. The Security Council
put the collective security train in motion immediately following the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in early August 1990. Thereafter, as long
as the Security Council remained actively seized with the issue, the
principle of collective self-defense had to be harmonized, not negated,
but harmonized with collective security in the implementation of these
particular resolutions. One of you asked me, "what about Kuwait
and the right of individual self-defense?" My response to that is that
Kuwait retains the inherent right of individual self-defense unless
otherwise directed by the Security Council and it was not otherwise
directed by the Security Council, but the reality is that Kuwait could
not exercise that right in any meaningful way without collective security
supporting it. The efforts of Kuwaiti resistance fighters, etc., all of
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that I would consider to be perfectly legal under the circumstances.
An effective collective security system determines how the principle
of self-defense will be implemented. If the system of collective security
proves incapable, as it so often has since World War II, of responding
to an act of aggression, then there has been a failure to implement
the principle of self-defense on the kind of collective basis envisioned
by the framers of the U.N. Charter. If and when collective security
fails, then there certainly arises, or more likely reappears, a legitimate
basis for relying on the inherent right of collective defense affirmed
in Article 51 of the Charter.
In the Kuwait crisis the United States was confronted for all intents
and purposes with the no-lose legal proposition. If it obtained the
approval of the Security Council to use force against the Iraqi army
then collective security was working. If, however, the Security Council
had balked at a proposed resolution of authorization and drifted into
a state of perpetual indecision while Iraq's aggression against and
occupation of Kuwait remained unchallenged, then the United States
and its allies could have fallen back on Article 51 and armed force
in collective self-defense of Kuwait. When that point would have been
reached would have been a speculative and subjective determination.
It would be futile to define the point where sole reliance upon
collective security can be legally abandoned in favor of sole reliance
upon the right of collective self-defense. Yet this imprecision in in-
ternational law does not deny the legitimacy of the distinction. The
Kuwait crisis at least established the important precedent that collective
security can be implemented within a reasonable period of time.
And I want to stress that we need to keep in perspective now that
the war is over, and it seems like everything worked like tick-tock,
that in many respects the Administration had to be compelled and
persuaded to seek that Security Council authorization for the use of
force. Remember the public, official position was that "we don't need
the Security Council, we can do this specifically under collective self-
defense," but a lot of pressure was put on the United States, and
for a lot of very practical political reasons; if they wanted to do it,
they needed the world behind them. And the U.N. Charter provided
the means to do that. And finally Resolution 678 was obtained, and
it was used as the fundamental premise to the air war and the ground
war. No one talked about collective self-defense after November 29,
1990. They talked about collective security.
Furthermore, for you constitutional lawyers in the audience, in
January 1990 the same pattern developed where in previous months
the Administration had argued that it did not need congressional
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approval to go to war, and yet it was persuaded that there was some
logical sense in getting this, and a lot of us argued that there was a
legal basis for seeking that authorization for Congress as well. They
got the authorization and you didn't hear anything after that about
Executive prerogative to go to war. You heard about American prer-
ogatives to go to war. So there are still some things to work out
there for lawyers; it will require a lot of work by the legal community
to iron out what remain to be substantive differences on the theory
of how we actually go about doing these things.
A collective security action taken with the authorization of the
Security Council arguably may permit the use of armed force in a
manner that exceeds some of the traditional parameters of self-defense
actions. The law of collective self-defense labors under certain con-
straints: proportionality, necessity, and the request of the victim state.
But if the Security Council authorizes military action to enforce its
resolutions, as was the case in the Kuwait crisis, then the need and
the right may arise to employ disproportionate force not only to repel
an aggressor but to defeat it in a definitive manner so the aggressor
no longer can be a threat to international peace and security. In
Resolution 678, the Security Council authorized all necessary means
to require the withdrawal of the Iraqi army in Kuwait as well as to
enjoy international peace and security in the region. The latter objective
can encompass actions such as attacks to destroy or weaken Iraqi
military assets far from the Iraq/Kuwait border, that normally might
not be considered legitimate for purposes of self-defense.
Further, whether a U.N. authorized military action must comply
with all of the laws of war in order to achieve the Security Council's
objective remains a debatable proposition. One could argue that the
higher moral objective of a collective security action (for example, to
restore international peace and security and eliminate the threat of
aggressive use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or other
threats of future aggression) might permit a larger degree of collateral
civilian casualties and property damage than the use of more highly
destructive weaponry that otherwise would be prohibited by the laws
of war, particularly in a limited self-defense action. But I stress that
that is debatable. We have not resolved that under international law.
In fact our esteemed chairman was on a committee of the American
Society of International Law in the early 1950's that looked at this
question in light of the Korean War and came up with certain con-
clusions. Other conclusions were reached by the French Institute of
International Law in the early 1970's. But these are independent bodies.
They are looking at it. We have no definitive guidance on this par-
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ticular issue of U.N. authorized use of force in compliance with the
laws of war. So this will be a key issue for lawyers to examine in
the future.
Now there is a grand presumption incorporated in Chapter 7 of
the Charter that member states may not rise to the challenge of a
U.N. enforcement action unless they are compelled to do so. Chapter
7 establishes a step-by-step procedure partly designed to compel the
performance by member states. Escalating steps include condemnation,
provisional measures, economic sanctions and other non-military ac-
tions, the Security Council's authorization for the use of force, and
finally, if they have been ratified, actual use of forces under U.N.
authority pursuant to Article 43 Special Agreements.
This elaborate scheme anticipates the hard case; namely one where
a member state not only can be directed to participate in an enforce-
ment action but would be obligated to provide a predetermined number
of military forces at the request of the Security Council. In many
respects, however, the Kuwait crisis represented the easy case. A
multinational army that was deployed to the Persian Gulf region at
the request of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia obviated the need for the
special agreements contemplated by Article 43 of the Charter and the
U.N. military command structure described elsewhere in Chapter 7.
The technical argument about whether the Security Council can
authorize any military action in the absence of Article 43 forces, that
argument was over-shadowed by the larger realities that the permanent
members acted in unison on the Security Council Resolution 678
(notwithstanding China's abstention), and that three of them com-
mitted troops to the defense of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
The fact that the coalition troops were transformed into a potential
offensive force with the adoption of Resolution 678, and finally a
fighting armed force on January 16, 1991, represents an extraordinary
development in the history of the U.N. Charter and, for that matter,
the history of warfare.
I would argue that the era of being intimidated by the provision
of the U.N. Charter is over. The Charter is a flexible document and
can be interpreted as such. If one applies a narrow positivist inter-
pretation to the Charter, then what one is trying to achieve through
the Charter may be stymied. In other words, if one relies heavily on
the Charter for legal guidance but then construes the Charter provisions
too precisely within a positivist paradigm, then it may become ex-
ceptionally difficult to implement those provisions. This was especially
true in the Kuwait crisis. We talked this morning about some of the
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difficulties in interpreting the provisions of the Charter with respect
to sanctions.
Another issue during the early months of the Kuwait crisis involved
the special agreements called for by Article 43 of the Charter. The
argument was that "well, we can't really do anything here because
they haven't been ratified, we don't have these forces available to the
Security Council, that is the end of the story, you can't go to war
under U.N. authority." Well, first we know that pursuant to Article
39 of the Security Council there can be recommendations for military
actions to maintain or restore international peace and security. Second,
Article 42 does not condition an authorization to use military force
on the existence of any special agreement. Nothing in the Charter
language prevents the Security Council from authorizing a member
state from using its national armed forces to enforce a Council Res-
olution.
The legislative history of the Charter, with which Professor Sohn
was so integrally involved, suggests that the intention of the framers
was to create a U.N. rapid deployment force which the Council could
call upon at any time to either dissuade would be aggressors or to
respond quickly to acts of aggression. With Article 43 Special Agree-
ments in place, the Council could direct or command member states
to participate in a military action and contribute certain numbers of
armed forces to the collective effort. In the absence of those agree-
ments, the Council certainly can authorize a member state to use its
armed forces in an enforcement action if that member so chooses.
Whether the Council could legally compel a member state to use
armed forces without the foundation of an Article 42 agreement is a
far more difficult question. It certainly was not inconceivable during
the Kuwait crisis that the Security Council could invoke Article 42,
acknowledge the presence of the multinational force that had gathered
in the Persian Gulf region, and authorize the various contingents of
that force to enforce Security Council resolutions. Of course, the
Security Council action would be an authorization, not a legal com-
mand. Therefore, it would remain in the hands of each participating
government in the multinational force to decide whether its troops
would be committed to the offensive campaign, and that is precisely
what happened in January 1991 when the Gulf War commenced.
Significantly, however, the Security Council did not explicitly invoke
Article 42 when it adopted Resolution 678. Rather the Council referred
generally to its authority under Chapter 7 to authorize military en-
forcement action against Iraq. This was not unusual, for the Security
Council had acted under Chapter 7 in many of its prior resolutions
[Vol. 22:9
INTERNATIONAL USE OF FORCE SYMPOSIUM
on the Kuwait crisis and it acted sometime without even referring to
Chapter 7 in other situations which required enforcement action in
earlier years.
I am not going to get into how to deal with the Military Staff
Committee, but it is definitely possible to use the Military Staff
Committee or not to use it at the discretion of the Security Council.
It really acts at the pleasure of the Security Council and it is not a
rigid obstacle to enforcement action.
Now the drafters of the U.N. Charter opposed creation of a standing
U.N. police force or U.N. army. First, it was argued that it is easier
to control an ad hoc army than a standing army because the former
minimizes the danger that the U.N. police force might itself become
a threat to world security.
Second, an ad hoc force dissuaded notions that the United Nations
might become a super state with a large standing army that would
intimidate member states at will. Third, the ad hoc force was more
acceptable to the great powers-China, France, Soviet Union, U.K.,
the United States-that convened at Dumbarton Oaks, because each
wanted to keep its own armed forces under national control except
in the kind of emergency situations that they all would agree would
require concerted action under Article 42.
There is a unique arrangement provided for in Article 45 that would
require that national air force contingents be immediately available
to the Security Council but still separate from the Council's formal
organization. I think it is interesting to note that in 1942, U.S. Vice-
President Henry Wallace said of this prospective U.N. Air Corps
(which does not exist today) "when this war comes to an end [World
War II] the U.N. will have such an overwhelming superiority in air
power that we shall be able to enforce any mandate." He later said
the method would be to bomb the aggressor nations mercilessly until
they ceased fighting. I remembered that when General Dugan made
some of his infamous comments in September.
The unprecedented bombing campaign waged by the coalition air
force during the Gulf War reflects, perhaps unwittingly, the original
concept underpinning Article 45. In fact, at Dumbarton Oaks the
Soviet delegation was the strongest advocate of the U.N. air force,
but it only evolved into a less formal arrangement as now described
in Article 45. I believe I will leave to my colleague from Egypt any
discussion about Chapter 8 and regional arrangements, because that
is something that I think has tremendous potential.
Finally, I just want to point out that Article 106 of the Charter,
while we have not heard much about it, actually was the failsafe
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provision of the Gulf War, and in retrospect we should understand
something about it. Article 106 was drafted to deal with the very kind
of situation that the United Nations continues to confront in the absence
of the Special Agreements called for under Article 43. Article 106
authorizes the five powers which became the permanent members of
the Security Council to take "joint action on behalf of the organization
as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace
and security." This special authorization remains available until "the
coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43
has in the opinion of the Security Council enabled it to begin the
exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42."
There is no requirement that the decision to take joint action under
Article 106 must be made within or outside the Security Council. On
the one hand, Article 106 may be interpreted to authorize the five
powers to take joint action involving the use of force only after the
Security Council has determined existence of a threat to or breach
of the peace and decided that enforcement action involving the use
of armed force is necessary. But on the other hand, Article 106
provides a rather convenient method by which a multinational force
of the character which was deployed during the Kuwait crisis could
take enforcement action under the direction of the great powers,
which could have reached a decision outside of the Security Council
to use force offensively in conformance with the U.N. Charter and
on behalf of the United Nations. It is still on the books, still there,
and some day it still may be implemented.
Now a final point in this part of my remarks, and then I am going
to get to some very specific little points. A permanent U.N. military
force, even if properly trained and effectively managed, is not the
answer for the near future. There remains little likelihood that the
major powers or even other governments want to totally cut the
umbilical cord to those national forces that would be contributed to
this so-called permanent U.N. force. The framers of the Charter had
the right idea when they drafted Article 43 with its requirement for
special agreements between each member state and the United Nations.
Even though negotiations among the major powers broke down in
1947 over the obligations that could be imposed by special agreements,
the end of the Cold War offers a realistic prospect that these ne-
gotiations can be resumed. It is more pragmatic at this precarious
stage in the development of protective security to require that nations
make certain limited forces available on call to the Security Council
rather than to permanently deploy them in the service of the United
Nations. A permanent stand-by U.N. force might be a vision worth
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pursuing for the 21st century, but the organization will have taken
a major step if it can implement the Charter's original design in the
coming years.
Now I just want to make a few points and then I will pass the
torch here, about the Gulf War and its aftermath. I think we can
take some pride that in the Gulf War we witnessed the enforcement
of international law. It was never really put that way by the Ad-
ministration in the past. We have talked a lot about the Rule of Law
and decency and what is right, but the Administration's policy never
quite put it so bluntly as to say "we are here to enforce international
law and we have the legitimate right to do so."
They said it with different words, but I think we need to start
thinking of it in those terms. We are passing from an age of norm
creation in international law since World War II (one in which our
distinguished chairman was the key pillar of) to an age of international
law enforcement, and there are going to be tremendous challenges
for this generation of lawyers as to how we go about multilateral
and collective means of enforcing international law, both through
peaceful dispute settlement procedures and ultimately through the use
of military force. It includes what we do with the International Court
of Justice, what we do about international arbitration, conciliation,
and also how we use military force in the future.
I was somewhat amused to hear the remark of a Pentagon official
recently who was asked by a journalist whether the Pentagon was
compiling a list of violations of international law, war crimes, etc.,
and he said "not only are we doing so, but we are increasingly
impressed with our image of the fact that Saddam Hussein must have
awakened every morning and asked his advisors what international
law can I violate today."
The list is simply growing so long, and that means that we have
a tremendous challenge ahead of us on the issue of war crimes. I
might be corrected by our U.N. colleagues, but I don't think the
Security Council was going to address that in its immediate resolution.
It is something that will come down the pipe, and some things we
need to keep thinking about in that respect are: whether or not a
war crime's tribunal would be established by the U.N. Security Coun-
cil, whether it would be established by the coalition governments ala
Nuremburg and Tokyo, or whether war criminals will simply be
prosecuted in Saudi courts or Kuwaiti courts depending on who has
custody of the particular individuals. I think it is important to remind
ourselves that the Nuremburg Tribunal tried, convicted and sentenced
(I don't know, I think they sentenced) Martin Borman who was in
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absentia throughout the entire affair and I don't think he ever was
apprehended. We never quite knew what happened to Martin, but
the point is it is possible, theoretically, to think about a prosecution
in absentia as long as you have the appropriate authority or the
tribunal to do so and it is part of its Charter.
The other thing to keep in mind is that I think Saddam Hussein
and the Revolutionary Command Council will remain individuals who
for the rest of their lives will remain at risk of prosecution wherever
they are, and so we need to keep that in mind. As far as I know
war crimes do not have a statute of limitations and the fact that we
cannot gain custody next week or next month is not something we
need to panic over with respect to the Revolutionary Command
Council; even if they rule for another two or three years we don't
need to panic about it. Ultimately they may be brought to justice,
even by Iraqi courts, and I think that is one thing we have not
thought enough about. If an enlightened Iraqi government comes
into power, you may ultimately see these individuals prosecuted in
Iraq. But at the same time we have a tremendous political dilemma
ahead of us over whether or not to prosecute these individuals and
what sort of signals that sends to the Arab world, so these are all
things to keep in mind.
On the issue of reparations, I think we have already talked about
that this morning, in terms of frozen assets and getting control of
the oil revenue, but that I want to go further into. I want to in fact
stress the point that one of the future challenges for the Security
Council will be peacekeeping in the region. You are going to start
seeing some proposals, not perhaps in this immediate resolution that
you are going to hear about this weekend, but in later resolutions,
about deploying a U.N. peacekeeping and/or observer force in, per-
haps, occupied Iraq and perhaps along the Iraqi/Kuwait border. I
would envision that for the next few months you will see a very
heavy coalition force presence in the Security Zone but that there
will be the proposal and hopefully the implementation of a transition
of a draw down on that force and a build up of U.N. peacekeepers
to man that order and ensure security.
But there will definitely be a new peacekeeping role that might
involve some new duties for peacekeepers that we have not seen
before at the U.N., a particular kind of defensive posture that we
have not seen before, but those issues are all ahead of us on the
peacekeeping front.
I finally want to close with just a few very broad points about
what this all means for what we have been hearing is the "New
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World Order." The Gulf War has focused our minds on this issue
of what comes after the Cold War, and I would simply put down
on the table the following points: one of our largest challenges will
be to convince Arab nations, particularly those who were sympathetic
with the Iraqi cause, that the collective enforcement of international
law is in their own best interests and that the principles at stake in
the Gulf War are principles that are intended to protect their interests
as well, and unilateral American solutions or unilateral Arab solutions
to these problems are not going to build lasting peace and security
in the region. That is going to be a major challenge for what we
have come to term the "New World Order."
Further, I think we have seen quite rapidly that we have reached
the stage where there are situations where the use of force can be
authorized, where it is a legitimate tool for the enforcement of
international law. After all, that is what it was conceived to be in
1945, and we have a perfect model here of one way in which the
U.N. Security Council has resurrected that concept for us to follow.
I gave a talk in January of 1990 entitled "Controlling the Use of
Force" up in Washington where I listed what I thought would be
future areas in the post-Cold War world where force could be au-
thorized as a legitimate tool, and to get away from Brezhnev and
Reagan doctrine concepts of the use of force and to look at U.N.
authorized uses of force. And one of those tick lists was blatant
aggression, etc., and I can remember the response of the audience
at that time was "oh no, this is far too outrageous, we are in a
period of peace now and we want to build a peaceful world, with
force behind us," but I think the reality is that we can't predict the
future and these things are going to be reality.
Furthermore, we are talking a lot these days about the Rule of
Law, and especially here in the United States it is going to be
important that we remain consistent with that principle and that we
don't dive off the board into vast tracts of reinterpretation exercises
which can be so damaging to our own credibility in trying to build
a world where the Rule of Law persists.
I would also point out that it is very true that now that we are
in what I would consider the age of the enforcement of international
law; this is going to be at the top of the agenda of policy makers
in foreign ministries, in the White House, around the world. During
that age of norm creation it got to be kind of a tedious exercise as
the codifying of what we know as customary international law, or
what we decided to create as codified international law, really was
not a subject that hit the Oval Office all that often. But now those
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documents are on the books, and we are at a stage of enforcing
international law; when you go about enforcing it, you also have to
know what the norms are. Policymakers are going to be under much
greater demand or subjected to much more pressure to know what
those principles are. So I think the idea of the legal counsel that
policy makers are going to have to expose themselves to in the future
has to be at the top of our list of priority items, and it should give
encouragement to those of you interested in public international law
that this is a field of the future. It is going to be right at the top
of the agenda.
PROFESSOR Som: Thank you very much. That was a very com-
prehensive statement of the problems. I would like to add a few
footnotes to what has been said. The definition of aggression that
the United Nations adopted after many, many years of negotiation
contains quite a number of very interesting norms which, when they
started drafting the definition, people did not think they were ever
going to get, especially about indirect aggression by armed bands.
Second, we are of course now working very hard on the code of
offenses against peace and security of mankind which has become a
code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, and it is
getting broader and broader every year. Last year the International
Law Commission was authorized to study the question of establishing
an international criminal court. And in the next session, they are
supposed to actually try to draft a statute of this court.
Third, I would like to say that Mr. Scheffer's interpretation of
the Charter of being broad and flexible was the very interpretation
it was given after San Francisco. Paul-Boncour made a great speech
at the last session of the conference, saying "we have left behind
the mistakes of the League of Nations, we have put into the Charter
all of the necessary principles that would permit us very quickly when
an aggressor strikes, to strike back at him." They decided to give
the Security Council almost plenary power to do what is necessary,
what is important, to punish the aggressor for his aggression, and
to restore peace as quick as possible. And this was the basic mandate;
Chapter VII in a way has no limits. The first article, Article 39, is
written so broadly that it really permits the Council to do everything.
You can implement it this way but of course if you find it necessary
to implement it another way you have the power. But the limits are
(1) that you have five permanent members, if they agree, then they
certainly have the power to do it, and (2) in order to control the
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situation there were six, and are now ten nonpermanent members
who are elected by the General Assembly and represent the various
trends in the General Assembly. They are the watchdogs, and it is
their duty to provide the necessary possible restrictions and limitations.
If they voted differently from what the General Assembly wanted,
then they are certainly never going to get re-elected, so they have to
be very careful about this. In fact, it is now accepted that if you
are a nonpermanent member of the Security Council and if you act
against the wishes of the General Assembly, it might elect somebody
else, although that was not put in the text.
The other point that interested me is your statement about the air
force. It is not novel at all because during the 1930s, when we had
the first great conference on disarmament, the French from day one
insisted on an international air force to maintain the peace. And in
fact when President Eisenhower started talking about open skies, the
French immediately came back saying, "we need an international air
force today; not only open the skies but keep them open by having
an international air force."
Finally, on your other point relating to the transition period. We
start with the institutions that we have but we slowly change them
into something else. Dr. Caminos yesterday did not have time to tell
us the details of that but in the Dominican Republic case that actually
happened. There was an emergency; with the permission of the OAS,
Marines went there and stabilized the situation and saved the foreign
citizens who were in great danger, and then, under further negotations,
it was decided that the American force was to be replaced by an
international force and various countries provided contingents. A
Brazilian general was appointed to be in charge they were able to
restore peace. A good precedent of this kind could happen even here.
We are very lucky to have Mr. Mohammed Galal from Egypt who
studied in Egypt both law and political science. He then joined the
foreign ministry and has had a very distinguished career. He has
visited practically all the important states of the Niddle East that we
are talking about. He was ambassador to Jordan, Kuwait, United
Arab Emirates, and also spent some time in Norway and India. When
he was in Norway he published something in Norway and when he
was in India he published various things in India and he was not
simply observing but he was doing.
Another distinguished point in his career was that he participated
quite a lot in various Third World organizations. So he is just the
right man to tell us about how those organizations function. I give
you now Mr. Galal.
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The Gulf Crisis and the Role of Egypt of Support International
Law
AMBASSADOR GALAL: Thank you Professor Sohn. In fact, I am in
a difficulty, to tell you frankly, that after such distinguished speakers,
my job has become even harder to follow suit and to speak with
such eloquence and in such a scholastic manner, in the way Professr
Sohn or Mr. Scheffer, and others have spoken. However, I will try
to venture to speak not as a diplomat, because luckily we are not
on any diplomatic forum now, but among scholars so we try to
imitate them, and you can imagine when you are not a scholar and
you try to imitate scholars what a mess you do to yourself.
My presentation here today will be divided into four parts. The
first part will be how this crisis started; the second, what activities
in the different regional forums have been done to try to solve or
to rally support to solve the crisis; third, the aftermath-what pri-
orities; and fourth, some conclusions.
So to start with, a heading: the Gulf Crisis and the role of Egypt
to support international law. When I was in law school my law
professor, who was a distinguished student of Professor Sohn some
years ago, asked me to write an analysis about oil and the difference
in the oil agreement in eastern Arab countries, the Gulf and Saudi
Arabia, as compared to the agreement between Algeria and France.
I wrote a paper of ten pages and I gave it to him. He read it and
he said to me, "It's a very good one, but I am afraid nobody is
going to read it, so better to make it just one page so that people
can read it." And that was the end of my lengthy contributions in
anything.
The crisis started in so many stages. The first stage, which Professor
Sohn mentioned, was in 1961 when Iraq never accepted that Kuwait
could be an independent state. This is also due to the oil; if there
was not oil there, for sure Iraq would not have cared to have had
so many kilometers. But anyway, when Kuwait got its independence
in 1961, Iraq was keen to get it back into its Iraqi fold. And there
was a struggle. And you know history is exactly as international law,
with all respect. It is very flexible and you can interpret it in so
many ways as the famous professor said, "you can interpret Article
39 this way or that way." So that is exactly the case with the history.
They had to follow with ample approach the political interests and
economic interests, and then invent certain rules of law to substantiate
what they want. And you can, as our distinguished colleague from
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the Soviet Union and the Legal Committee, find certain arguments
now and the next day you find another different argument from this
same delegation. Not necessarily a certain delegation or a specific
delegation, but any delegation. You name it, you will find there is
an everyday different argument, and so on. So the point is that in
1961 the British came in but also they couldn't fill in the shoe exactly,
because it was the age of Arab Nationalists and Arab aspiration.
The British came in but very quickly the Security Council, trying to
discuss the issue, resulted to the Regional Arrangement since it was
the age of the Cold War and the Security Council was paralyzed.
The Arab League came into being with the Regional Arrangement,
which is referred to in Chapter 8 of the Charter of the United Nations.
So the Arab League filled the vacancy because the U.N. was paralyzed
and sent a peacekeeping force. This peacekeeping force consisted of
three or four countries, among them Egypt. This peacekeeping force
stayed in Kuwait from 1961 to 1963 until Iraq had an agreement and
recognized Kuwait in 1963. So the peacekeeping forces were with-
drawn. This is probably one of the blessings of the Regional Ar-
rangement, that you can withdraw them quickly, while the International
Peacekeeping Operation tend to have a longer stay, so many years
like in Cyprus for example, and in many other occasions like Lebanon,
and so on. Probably the exception is just Iran-Iraq now. They dis-
mantled it in Afghanistan partly but they put it in a different shape.
In the beginning of July 1990 we had an Arab meeting, a council
of the Arab League. Iraq wrote a long statement, a long letter against
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirants accusation of waging an ec-
onomic war against Iraq through their oil policy. They were over-
producing their oil, during down prices, which affected Iraq badly.
So we tried, as Egypt, to mediate, and to contain this crisis. The
President of Egypt went personally and had a meeting with President
of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and we came to a conclusion that he
accepted to have a meeting in Saudi Arabia with the Prime Minister
of Kuwait and Vice President of Iraq to try to settle the matter
peacefully. This was on July 30 and they stayed in that meeting for
one day, meeting in two sessions. The first session was just an opening
for a photo and the second was only restricted to an introduction
by Iraq of their claims, and then the Iraqi pretended that he was
sick, and could not continue, and he left. He left at the end of
August 1, and the midnight of the second was the invasion. So this
shows us how this manipulation of the process started. This led to
a reaction from Egypt and other Arab countries that we took a matter
of principle, as the distinguished speakers have mentioned earlier; as
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an American you take pride that you have to enforce international
law, so we can claim that we also as a matter of pride tried to
enforce the concept of solving the principles in accordance with
international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
It so happened at that time that there was a meeting of the Islamic
conference in Cairo. It was a regular meeting, but the invasion of
Kuwait took place while that conference was taking place in Cairo,
and we had the foreign ministers of forty-six countries there, from
different parts of the world. The meeting made a statement, a strong
one, condemning the Iraqi invasion and asking for the Iraqi with-
drawal, and Egypt was presiding over that meeting. Meanwhile, this
meeting was suspended, and the Arab countries had another meeting
at the ministerial level which also led to a resolution to condemn the
Iraqi aggression and to ask Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait uncon-
ditionally. In both of these two meetings, there was no unanimity.
There was no unanimity on that-it was a majority who condemned
it and a very small minority, they are all Arab countries and you
know them, who abstained or opposed; two opposed-Iraq, because
they were the aggressor, and another country-and the others ab-
stained under different pretexts.
However, the majority were supportive of condemning Iraq and
asking for the withdrawal of Iraq. The efforts increased or intensified
one week later, on 3 August, and on 9 August President Mobarek
called for an Arab summit to be held, which took place in Cairo,
also. President Mubarak was chairing that meeting and this Arab
summit was very much instrumental in rallying the support for Kuwait
against Iraq. This summit made a long resolution which condemned
the Iraqi actions and so on, but most important it spoke about
allowing other countries to respond to the request from Saudi Arabia
to send forces to defend Saudi Arabia. This was done on the frame-
work of the Arab League Charter and another charter within the
Arab League system, with mutual cooperation and assistance. This
packet of mutual cooperation and assistance in security matters was
invoked, as well as the Charter of the Arab League, to send forces
from Egypt, Syria, and other Arab countries, to Saudi Arabia to
help them against a potential Iraqi aggression after invading Kuwait.
Meanwhile, one month later, a ministerial meeting of nonalignment
took place on the first of October in New York and that meeting
passed a statement to condemn the Iraqi aggression and to ask for
full Iraqi withdrawal from occupied Kuwaiti territory. These complete
steps intended to do two things. First to rally the public opinion in
the developing countries against the Iraqi aggression. Generally among
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the developing countries, we easily unite to condemn the super powers,
because usually we have to take a different perspective than the
prospective which you have, and which the distinguished speakers
mentioned before, of aggression. For us as a developing country the
concept of aggression generally comes from the super powers. This
is also a different approach, because the British and the French have
been occupying most of the world. I don't want to speak about
American relations with Latin America, in different perspectives than
in the Dominican Republic. I remember that when I was a student,
and I did a study about the American "invasion" of Grenada, but
it is a different way to look at things when you belong to different
part of the world. The geography here, it has a very important impact
on your thinking on how to see things. So from this point, what I
want to say is that Egyptian diplomacy managed to rally the Third
World countries for the first time to condemn another Third World
country for invading their neighbor. This happened for the first time
with humbleness due to Egyptian diplomacy. Recall when Iraq invaded
Iran; there were so many activities, the nonaligned movement never
dared to condemn Iraq for their invasion of Iran. The same happened
when other countries invaded Afghanistan. The nonaligned movement
was divided because India, as a regional power, did not take this
stand, but took a different stand. And here I am speaking very
frankly. I am not speaking as a diplomat, but this is real politics.
This is real: national interest comes first, irrespective of any other
consideration. In a case like Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it is number
one national interest in the United States or national interest in Egypt
(we put it in a very nice beautiful framework of international law,
which is really there also, luckily). The concept of national interests
is the driving force for fighting against aggression. Probably because
of my background in the political science and international relations,
is why I am concentrating on the concert of national interest.
We managed to have resolution after resolution in the developing
countries forums-nonalignment, Islamic conference, Arab League-
to condemn Iraq. But more than this, in the Security Council itself,
those in other leagues were witnesses as Egypt and some other coun-
tries who have national interest against the Iraqi invasion and the
occupation of Kuwait, were lobbying hard with the members of the
Security Council to convince them to pass also one resolution after
the other. Of course, it was not thanks to our efforts only, but
through thanks to so many efforts by many parties and many mem-
bers, and the clear-cut case of invasion, because there are many cases
where you can argue that this is not clear and you need more evidence
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and so on. This case was very clear-cut state of aggression. We also
contributed in highlighting the violation of human rights by Iraq in
Kuwait in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly in the last
session, and this resolution was passed also in spite of some disa-
greement from Iraq on how to interpret the Charter of the United
Nations and the division of work between the Security Council and
the General Assembly. As one of the speakers yesterday was referring
to, when the Security Council is seized with an issue, the General
Assembly should stop discussing it. In spite of this and with such a
vast majority, the General Assembly adopted this resolution against
Iraq and condemned the Iraqi violation of human rights. And this
was also thanks to this clear-cut position and the efforts by many
countries, including mine. These were some points on the second part
of my presentation, what happened when developing countries rallied
to support a solution to the crisis.
Third, the aftermath and the priorities. The best approach was
shown in the testimony of Mr. Baker in Congress a few days ago,
talking about the necessity to have economic cooperation and to
address the gap between the rich and the poor as well as to have
security arrangements and to try to tackle the Palestinian and Israeli
question. In fact, this was a prelude to it, but more important in
this year, I would like to add the Egyptian outlook on these three
issues. The regional security, we envision out of our experience, should
come from the region and should be the exclusive responsibility of
the region itself. And here, as I stated, we look from different
perspectives to the matter. So when you have the long-term arrange-
ment for security, it should be a regional responsibility; but when
you have an act of aggression, which a region cannot stop, then you
need international support and an international rally to fight against
aggression. There are two different stages: the stage of aggression,
which is clear in the Iraqi case; and the stage of after the aggression-
long-term security arrangements. The other issue, then, is regional
cooperation. We have also in the framework of the Arab League
and many Arab subregional groups some arrangement for coopera-
tion, but these arrangements were not enough and they did not do
very much to help in it because of the different levels of development
of each Arab country, as well as the difference in natural resources.
The Gulf countries were afraid that other big countries like Egypt
with so much population and not enough resources, would take all
the resources from them. The Egyptians tried to help, but also from
a different perspective. But now, if we are talking about the era after
the Cold War, the era of interdependence, then we have to look
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forward in a spirit of not thinking about selfish interests of a certain
country, but the interests of a region which goes after the interregional
integration.
So here we envision, we also held a ministerial meeting in Cairo
between eight Arab countries-Egypt, Syria, and the six Gulf coun-
tries-to look into the future and to see how we can arrange our
cooperation, our security in the long-term. One of the problems which
raised the question always is the third one, the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. I insist that it should be called not Arab-Israeli conflict but
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, because it is located in a certain area.
This area is called Palestine so it is between the Palestinians and the
Israelis who are living in the same area; historically it is called like
this and it will continue like this. However, you have two peoples,
the Israelis and the Palestinians. They are fighting for so many
reasons, we will not go into the issues, but the most important is
that they both had the right to this land. We have to help them to
think in a futuristic approach to co-exist together, work peacefully
together, to satisfy the aspirations of both in one way or another so
we can help the stability of the whole region. We've had recent
resolutions of the Security Council on the Gulf issue, but two in
these past six months were not on this, but on Israeli treatment of
the Palestinians. And you can compare these two resolutions with
any of the twelve Gulf resolutions. The two were very mild, very
soft, just a touching smoothly on Israel that we request, we beg you,
just treat the Palestinians in a nice way. We have a responsibility as
a regional power, as Egypt, and you have a responsibility as a super
power, as the United States, and a friend of both the Arabs and the
Israelis, to work in a futuristic approach, not looking at the Holocaust
or the 40's or 30's, but looking on the future: how to help the
Palestinians to be a nation, to be a state; how to help Israel to be
a nation and a state; and how to cooperate together. Otherwise you
will find we will go through a long period of turmoil and instability
in the whole region.
I raise this issue here because I feel with such intellectual distin-
guished personalities, you have a role. Especially the poor diplomats
like myself, we are white collar and just follow instructions to do
this or not to do that; but you are the future, especially the young
lawyers, you are the future and with your intellect and your back-
ground you can do a lot to help in this matter.
The conclusion here is we can think about what to do next. What
lessons will we draw from this crisis in the Gulf? The first lesson,
is that with the aggression by any country. With due respect to the
19921
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
excellent presentation earlier, and the work of the sanction committee
established by Resolution 661, it is not easy to fight through sanctions.
As my distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union would say,
Resolution 678 never mentioned the use of force, but it is well known
that its code name is the Use of Force Resolution. It is the same as
the League of Power, which is never mentioned in the Charter of
the United Nations, but it is well known that the League of Power
is used in different terms but the name is never mentioned. The
lesson is that economic sanctions, though they have impact, also have
consequences, and they can hurt a certain country, but they never
quite work adequately to stop aggression or to force a certain country
to change its position. The sanctions within the League of Nations
against Italy never stopped the Italian aggression against Abyssinia
at that time, and on the contrary it led to war. The sanctions after
the Second World War against Rhodesia or in the case of South
Africa never changed the two systems. Sanctions helped a little bit,
it made their life difficult, but political change in the international
arena is what forced the issues. The liberation movement in Rhodesia
or the liberation movement in South Africa lacks the different in-
ternational situation which helped to expedite the process of decol-
onization for the process of de-apartheid.
The second conclusion is the spirit of reconciliation. Now more
than any other time, we need a reconciliation in the Middle East. I
touched briefly about the reconciliation between the Israelis and the
Palestinians, but more important than this is reconciliation with Iraq
itself. As Mr. Schrijver and the others have touched upon, the rep-
aration issue after the First World War forced Germany into the
Nazi era because they could not afford to pay all this. What we
think as legal minds or politicians or diplomats is to think of the
future, in a spirit like Mr. Bush has mentioned in his statement to
suspend the hostilities. He said, if I recall the words, "it is not a
time for jubilation or celebration of a victory, but it is a time to
think about reconciliation, about how to address the wounds, how
to heal, to help, to recover the situation and to bring everyone into
order." This is the second conclusion.
The third conclusion which I also touched upon is the pivotal role
of the regional organizations as well as the regional councils. In a
certain region, as I said, the role of Egypt helped to rally support
for Kuwait and condemnation to Iraq. In other regions, other coun-
tries can play a role like this. We are living today in a post Cold
War era; probably this era will continue, but there is also speculation
that it will not continue, so we will come back to the Security Council
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and the United Nations with another form of a Cold War, you never
know, and in that we have to highlight the role of the regional
organization and the regional countries to help in the process of
maintaining peace and restoring stability. These are just small re-
flections which I dare to say. Thank you.
PROFESSOR SOHN: Thank you very much. It was a very good state-
ment from the point of view of the Third World, especially of the
Arab World, especially of the Egyptian point of view. And I think
it gives us what we needed very much, a look from another per-
spective. And sometimes we look too much from one point of view.
We think sometimes that the world centers on us, and we forget that
there are 4.5 billion people elsewhere, and I am glad that you were
able to bring this point of view to us.
Of course you by now probably know Mr. Wilner, but just to
remind you of what he has done I would like to say a few words.
First, he is the Thomas Kirbo Professor of International Law and
Director of Graduate Legal Studies at the University of Georgia
School of Law. He started his career in 1963 in one of the oldest
Universities in the United States, William & Mary. He has both a
Bachelor and Masters Degree in Law. He later went to Columbia
University, and spent some time in Brussels continuing graduate
studies. He later became Director of the Brussels Seminar on the
Law and the Institutions of the European Economic Community. He
has been teaching every year there as an Adjunct Professor of the
Free University of Brussels. He also started working in the United
Nations in 1969 for three years as a legal officer and became involved
in a number of things there. As a result he became a consultant to
the Conference on International Trade and Development called UNC-
TAD. After he became consultant to that organization, and as part
of his work for the Commission on Transnational Corporations, he
has been doing very special jobs for them including assistance to
various countries in West Africa and has been helping them in both
establishing international organizations and in dealing with foreign
corporations, etc. His specialty is transnational law and also arbi-
tration. He published a new edition of a book on international
arbitration a few years ago, and several other books and articles of
general interest. So I give you Professor Wilner.
Application of United Nations Measures in Other Current and
Future International Crises
PROFESSOR WILNER: Thank you Professor Sohn. That was very
kind of you. I am usually known as the other person who teaches
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at the University of Georgia Law School. It was very kind of Professor
Sohn to have alluded to my rather unillustrious past.
First, a few comments on the present structure of the political
organs of the United Nations charged with the maintenance of peace,
although one would like to change the theories about how one could
improve the system. I think we have all posited that this is the way
things are and this is the way the Charter is and as we all know, it
is difficult to amend it, etc. I think it is clear that when we talk
about the application of U.N. measures in other current and future
international crises, although the experience in the Persian Gulf crisis
is very instructive and is of importance for the future, I think there
will continue to be difficulties in finding agreement in the international
community on specific crises to which Chapter 7 and/or Chapter 8
might be applied, either under Article 39 or through the use of Article
39, or even Article 51, and that is self-defense, or collective self-
defense, in the sense that national interests are of great importance.
Very often when one thinks of the application of international law,
or the application of the rules by which we all live under the United
Nations Charter, there are such tremendous variations in the thinking
of the governments on when they should be applied that it is difficult
to predict which crises will bring about the use of measures involving
force to deal with a particular breach of international law or a breach
of the security or sovereignty of a particular country. If we go down
some lists of current disputes and problems, some relate to aggression
in the classical sense-the kind of aggression that we saw in the
invasion by Iraq of Kuwait-and others are much more complex and
include aggression but also are related to civil war. One finds that
it is difficult to see how one can posit a general model for when the
international community will take action. In Kuwait it was pretty
clear. I think the Iraqi army went into Kuwait looking for Kuwaitis
who wanted to become part of Iraq. They didn't find any, so there
was no question of civil war there. On the other hand, some situations
are more complex, like the situation of Lebanon. Our distinguished
colleague mentioned the Israeli-Palestine problem, but I think the
Lebanese problem is a problem that also ought to be dealt with by
the regional organization. And there may be others that crop up over
a period of time.
Kampuchea is a mishmash of all sorts of problems. There was the
aggression, at least it's posited that way by some, conducted by China
with respect to Tibet. There is the problem of Kashmir-is that not
an aggression that should be redressed? Is Pakistan entitled tb ask
the world to assist it in freeing Kashmir? Certainly India doesn't
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think so, and I think that these are some of the realities with which
we have to live.
I don't think it's a question of bad faith on countries who assert
the notion that in fact aggression has been committed or that in
some other way there is a threat to peace as a result of which the
Charter should be invoked either under Article 39 or 51. But I think
that it's just a reality today that we are not yet at the stage where
we can as a matter of routine have countries go to the Security
Council and have them determine "Oh yes, this is in fact what makes
it necessary to invoke Chapter 7." I think that is something for us
to ponder. The United States has been accused in the case of the
Persian Gulf of having been involved for all sorts of reasons. I was
in France recently and some rather conservative business people said,
"Well aren't you in a recession, don't you need a war so that the
country can recover from the recession?" Frankly I try to be critical
even of my own country when necessary, but this is not something
that had occurred to me and I don't think that this is the basic
motivation of the United States.
Once again, I think that it is a good faith motivation, but on the
other hand it's not necessarily perceived as such. And in other cir-
cumstances, where a state should act or where the community of
nations should act there may be no action, even though action could
be taken under Chapter 7, and that's the problem I think. The problem
is there is no one to force us to say an aggression has been committed
and the U.N. should do something about it immediately. Sometimes
some of the most heinous of aggressions and some of the most
heinous behavior has never been punished-in Kampuchea we see
this as a very great reality. We talk about war criminals and talk
about persons who of course were in absolute breach of human rights
obligations, yet nothing really has been done; in fact some govern-
ments continued to recognize that regime for a very long time. So
while it's true that national interests are still involved and while it
is true that in many cases good faith efforts are made to redress
threats to the peace and aggression, it's still very selective and I wish
we could find a system whereby that could be redressed. And perhaps,
and this is really the other comment that I would like to make,
perhaps we ought to use regions or groupings of states to raise the
alarm, to be at the forefront of dealing with specific acts of aggression.
We do have regional groupings in the sense of geographical regions.
We have regional groupings in terms of economic, social, and cultural
interests or cohesion. These are usually self-selected groups of coun-
tries, and the potential I think is very great that at that level good
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faith identification of real problems could be made for the sake of
peace in that particular part of the world. The danger with that of
course is that should a regional group be based on the economic or
military domination of one country, that certainly is not consistent
with the Charter. That is to say, one country keeps the peace of the
region in its own fashion and that's not the idea. Alternatively, in
a sense the regional peace should not be kept by the majority against
the interests of a minority of states with differing idealogies or
differing ethnic composition. So of course there still is the danger
in the regional grouping of the state interests or group interests acting
to the exclusion of some member of that region. It occurs to one
then that the imperfect system that we have today will have to continue
to operate on the two levels, and that the system as it exists now is
not consistent with what we really would like to have, but it has
functional results in many cases and the lesson to be learned, I assume,
from this successful application of the United Nations system is that
it is possible and that one should persevere in making use of the
system.
At one point I think there was a general pessimism, a view that
in fact the system could never work, would never work, part of it
due to the Cold War, part of it due to a certain isolationism or
pessimism with respect to international solutions of problems. But I
think that we've gotten over that, at least for the moment, and we
ought to pursue these new elements of good will in the international
community as far as they can go.
Let me stop here and see what the rest of our discussion will bring
US.
PROFESSOR SOHN: Thank you Gabe. A slightly pessimistic, perhaps,
point of view on the subject. But we can come back to this later.
And I would like to give the floor to a much more radical thinker
about the future, Professor Mendlovitz. At this point he has a very
interesting title, Professor of Peace and World Order Studies at
Rutgers School of Law and has been teaching since the 1960s. For
a while he did some work with New York University, at Columbia,
and now at the University of Chicago. He also for a long time was
Director of another great project, World Order Models Project based
in New York at the World Order Institute, in which he looked at
that subject from a transnational point of view gathering people from
all over the world, eminent jurists, sociologists, and others to try
and look at what kind of world order we would like to have and
he got some very interesting results out of it.
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He has done also many other things. He has written many books,
many collections. He has received several awards, one from UNESCO
for instance, and presidential award for outstanding public service
at Rutger's University. I give you Professor Mendlovitz.
The Gulf Crisis and Possibilities for a Peaceful Future World
Order
PROFESSOR MENDLOVITZ: I am somewhat intimidated because of
the titan to my left here. He knows everything. Indeed if you travel
with him he carries with him on the one hand all of the railroad
charts of a particular region of the world you are in and wine lists
in the other. So he is the perfect companion. I mean he is a marvelous
man to have aboard.
This has been an extraordinarily rich day and a half. I hope most
of you, especially the students, have had an opportunity to listen,
because there has been a kind of sense of craft with regard to both
the Charter and the problems, so that this symposium has been on
the one hand legalistic in the best sense of the word, and at the same
time has attempted to provide some sort of sense of where it might
go.
Let me begin with George Bush, a good place to begin. "We have
before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future
generations a New World Order. A world where the Rule of Law,
not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations." This was
delivered on January 16, 1992, announcing the opening attacks in
the Persian Gulf War. We are not yet clear what, the New World
Order is but I would like to give you a speech of January 29 in his
State of the Union message. "The world can therefore seize this
opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a New World Order
where brutality will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective
resistance. Yes, the United States bears a major share of leadership
in this effort. Among the nations of the world, only the United States
has had both the moral standing and the means to back it up. We
are the only nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of
peace. "
Now that may have been for home consumption, or indeed it may
be accurate. But if I were sitting in Egypt, or in India, or in the
Soviet Union, and I heard the speaker or the President of the United
States state that language, I would have thought that the message of
the world order that was coming through was the world order in
which Pax Americana had returned to the face of the world, and
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that the ordering of the globe was to be done from Washington,
D.C.
I was delighted, as Ambassador Galal pointed out, that George
Bush showed some sensitivity on the day that the carnage was over,
to talk about this is not a time for jubilation. I am hoping somehow
that in the negotiations which are taking place in the Security Council
that the Security Council will, shall I say, reassert its proper role in
all of this, but it is a kind of an extraordinary notion that somehow
or other we are the only leaders that are available for this when we
are at a moment of history when I believe if we do not have collective
enterprise, we will go down.
So let me begin by giving to you what future studies people call
some scenarios of the future. And I will just state them.
First is a loose hegemonic world run by the United States using
the U.N. when it needs to, using its client states throughout the
world, setting up wherever it needs summer relationships with what
they consider to be a weaker and troubled Soviet Union, worrying
a little about the Peoples' Republic of China, but in the end it runs
things.
Second, a balance of powers system going back to the 1974, 1975
speeches of Kissinger and Nixon, that we are going to set up a Big
Five. The Big Five are going to run the world. It will be a concert
of the globe the way we had the concert of Europe in the 19th
Century.
Third, we are going to have a tight hegemonic power. It will really
be run by the United States.
Fourth, we are going to have some form of functionalism.
Fifth, we are going to have regionalism.
Sixth, we are going to have a modern, medieval society ala Hedley
Bull.
Seventh, we are going to have levenization.
Eighth, we are going to have an Orwellian world.
Ninth, we are going to have bioregionalism.
Tenth, Shumaker wins and small is beautiful.
Now, all of those strands exist as both predictions and in some
cases preferences. I would say 7 out of the 10 there exist as preference.
And it makes a difference in the way you analyze what is taking
place and when you state to the Third World which of those worlds
you think is possible, which is likely, and which you want. That is,
it is not really that law is not positivistic and that the framework
that we use is flexible, it is that we are in pursuit of values. Law is
a value realizing process and it uses the normative order to achieve
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those values. It has a normative order, the oughts; it has institutions
and processes of procedures. What it is you think you are trying to
realize, the maximization or the optimization of those values, seems
to me to be very significant.
Now let me state my vision of a just world order. My vision of
a just world order is a world in which security for people has replaced
security for states. My vision of a just world order is a world where
a global political economy is geared into a basic need world and
sustainable growth. My world is a human rights regime meeting
tolerable levels of human rights throughout the world. And my world
is an environmental regime in which attention is placed on pollution,
resource depletion, and quality of life.
Don't most people want that world? Well, first of all I think it
is like mom and apple pie, and what do I mean by that? A lot of
people don't want to be mothers, and a lot of people have stopped
eating apple pie. These are not a set of pieties in other words. They
are a set of values which certain people throughout the globe are
trying to realize and others are fighting. So it becomes crucial in the
way you analyze what has taken place in the Gulf Crisis, to get to
what we are supposed to talk about-what it is that you want to
achieve.
One of the elements which we have all been working at here today
is the element of what I would call its mythic quality. How will we
now relate to the major meaning of what has taken place on the
face of the globe and put it into our political history into our political
thoughts? What do we make of it? What we have been doing here
through legal analysis is trying to demonstrate what we think it would
come to, and therefore it is very sensible that we do a kind of tough
minded analysis of the Charter and the provisions and the Resolutions.
As part of what I will call still world order thinking, I conceive
of modern international law and in that modern political international
relations, the global political system, which emerged someplace be-
tween the 14th and the 17th century, and which most international
lawyers like to put in 1648 because it gives it a nice resting place,
the Treaty of Westphalia. I prefer, actually, 1625, the Grocher's Book
on the Laws of War and Peace. For me the Laws of War and Peace
is what I call a Grocher noma; somebody attempted to take what
was taking place in the breakdown of medievalism and put it into
a kind of modern framework and permitted then, or legitimated, the
notion of a state system that then emerged in 1648. I conceded that
to have six elements which are with us. I would call them territoriality;
state sovereignty with its national interest; an uncritical acceptance
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of violence as a necessary component of state sovereignty; industri-
alization and unlimited growth; secularism, the breaking away from
the sort of sacred society; and finally capitalism in the marketplace,
just re-emerged again but a dominant notion up until 1920, and now
reheard. Those I take it to be the six components of what we consider
to be the modern political economy and military system.
And what I want to say about each of those is that they are under
attack. Each one of them. Despite the fact that people want territory,
despite the fact that people want unlimited growth, there are people
throughout the world beginning to question the validity of each of
those. It is precisely because those are being questioned that we have
sort of this difficulty of providing ourselves with what I would say
is a clear vision of where to go and what to do.
Okay, with that in mind now, let me move directly to the twelve
resolutions, and to the coalition. That is to say, let me move to what
George Bush considers to have been, and I believe was, his major
political achievement in all this. George Bush was able to get twelve
resolutions through the U.N., and you have heard the analysis, which
provided authorization, permitted him to engage in the kind of be-
havior he wanted to engage in with this society, and have these other,
depends on how you count them, 28 to 29 societies as part of the
coalition, so that every time he was speaking, he was speaking on
behalf of the international community.
Let me, however, remind you of some of the things that occurred.
The Soviet Union is in need of aid, in need of help, I would say-
and I apologize for this-but now that the Soviet Union is no longer
monolithic (and people don't take things on a political level, they
may take it personally), they were almost obsequious in their support
of the resolutions. The Chinese, in exchange for meeting the foreign
minister to overcome the Tiananmen Square problem, abstained from
Resolution 678. The New York Times said about Yemen, I quote,
and the New York Times has all the news that is fit to print, "Minutes
after the Yemeni Delegate joined the Cubans in voting against the
resolution of the Security Council on Thursday, a senior American
diplomat was instructed to tell him, 'That was the most expensive
vote you ever cast,"' meaning it could result in an end to more than
$70 million in American foreign aid to Yemen. Now some day some-
body is going to write up a full history of the arm-twisting, the
cajoling, the carrots, the sticks, but these are not jokes. These are
what are going to come out, whether it is in Egypt, or in India, or
wherever in the world, and we use the word twist, they are going to
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help develop what is the mythic underpinning of this set of resolutions
and what we actually did.
If indeed it turns out that it was U.S. interest-oriented, and that
is all it was blood for oil, if that is what it turns out to be, well,
that is one thing. If it turns out, as I happen to believe the case,
that part of this was that many states leaders were absolutely appalled
by the aggression, there is just no question about it. So now you
have this very sort of ambivalent attitude and ambiguous attitude on
the one hand, and in my view Saddam Hussein is a war criminal.
He planned and prepared and executed a war of aggression. Although
aggression, incidentally, was never used in the resolutions, invasion
is used and there was a breach of the peace, because the Security
Council did not decide there was an aggression. Somehow all they
decided was that there was an invasion and a breach of the peace.
So most of the states, and many people throughout the world,
were just appalled by the aggression. Furthermore many of us-and
now I say us in the sense of being in the peace movement, and you
should understand I as a member of the peace movement am an
abolitionist-believe that it is possible to dismantle the war system.
I take this seriously. I was in favor in some grudging fashion of
American troops going to Saudi Arabia. I thought that 50,000 would
have been enough. I allowed 200,000. When he sent in another 200,000
I said "oh my God, they have gotten to him," and when he started
the war with that bombing, that merciless bombing, I was appalled,
absolutely appalled.
Now we have the resolutions. I do not have to go through the
sanction resolutions because they were done very well this morning
by my colleague, extraordinarily well. But I want to say a few words
about the economic sanctions before I go on to 678.
The United States was faced with a crucial decision between two
general lines of action. Course A was to propose to the U.N. Security
Council a further resolution authorizing the initiation of hostilities
against Iraq, if it approved to initiate such an act. Course B, which
I obviously would prefer, would be to exercise patience and get the
embargo approved by the Security Council and give it more time to
work. Senator Sam Nunn of this great state of Georgia, believed that
giving the embargo a chance to work was the appropriate thing to
do. I happen to believe that that was the case. I happen to believe
that while it is true, as Daniel Scheffer pointed out this morning, it
was a matter of judgment. I believe it was a mistake, especially, to
engage in the kind of war we engaged in. Yes, I am absolutely pleased
and delighted that there were less than 500 U.S. and Allied casualties.
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I am also absolutely appalled at the image it brings tears to my eyes
of a minimum of 50,000 and it may be 100,000 people who are dead
on the Iraqi side, plus another 50,000 to 100,000 who are wounded.
Now, I know that there were coalition alliances, there were 40,000
Egyptians, there were Saudis and Kuwaitis, but that is an image of
the cowboys fighting the Indians. That is an image of the colonial
power, the Raj coming in and deciding what it will do when the
Indians are settled, and here is where I come to sort of shed this
point about whether or not collective security permits us to do away
with this proportionality discrimination and all those things which
we talk up in the laws of war. I must say that I am appalled at that
notion. I do not understand that just because we have engaged in a
collective enterprise we are now permitted to engage in bestial be-
havior. So there is this sense of that image that what we have done
has been extraordinary in the sense of the carnage.
It is difficult, trying to watch CNN, and trying to integrate into
my life the fact of what the Iraqis did to the Kuwaities; forcing
myself to look at that, and sort of reminding myself of the Holocaust
in most pictures and sort of saying they literally were below the level
of humanity, and as Schwartzkopf said about them, "they are not
humans like us." But the fact disturbs me, that this bombing was
extraordinary, and we are as a people beginning to delight in it.
Some time this morning George Bush said, "I had not been feeling
the euphoria of the American people, but I am beginning to feel it
now." So we are now about to have a victory parade, we are about
to bring the boys home and we are going to demonize more and
more these other individuals.
Now again I understand, I appreciate, I really appreciate as a man
who was born into this society, what it is to feel that we did not
have our boys and girls and woman get shot up, and yet if we are
going to use Resolution 678 as a rationalization for that form of
carnage, then I find it very difficult to take. Now I give it one saving
caveat; I do believe that Schwartzkopf and company might have
thought they had a much more difficult job than really was the case,
and in this sense there was literally overkill because they did not
have to do what they wanted to do. But they should have the humanity
to admit it.
That is, if reconciliation is to occur, then we have got to say 678
was overexercised as we used it. We did not know at the time that
that was the case. We were being what we thought was prudential.
Next time around we will do it differently. In addition to which if
you look at 678, the lessons for the future, one wonders why the
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United Nations gave up its control. Agreed, there was no reason.
That is, the Military Staff Committee does not have to come out,
the sanctions committee does not have to, but for all of those things,
there is flexibility in the policy level. But what was the reasoning
behind permitting them to do it, and why did the members of the
Security Council from the so-called Third World and the so-called
nonaligned permit it except for Yemen and Cuba who finally just
could not stand it. Right?
So Resolution 678 stands there. That is, the actual decision to use
force was made by the United States government, "in concert with
its allies in the coalition." It did not go back and ask the United
Nations whether it could do it. The decision to go in and to bomb
mercilessly was made by the U.S. air forces. The decision to go in
with the ground forces, again there was the customary "consultation."
I remember during the midst of the Cuban crisis the story of when
John Fitzgerald Kennedy sent Abe Cheyes to see DeGaul, and when
he went in to see DeGaul he said "I want to talk to you about what
is happening in Cuba" and DeGaul said "are you telling me or are
you asking my advice?" and Abe Cheyes said "I am telling you,
sir," and DeGaul said "okay." That is he just wanted to know. I
don't know whether these consolations were that sort or not. But it
is very important to know what actually occurred in those consul-
tations. I look at 678 and I ask myself the question, how valid would
it be if we do not immediately begin to think of how we would have
retained commander control.
Let me move on to the notion of security. Two years ago Am-
bassador Petrovski and our Deputy here from the Soviet Mission,
attempted to get the terminology of comprehensive security adopted
by the General Assembly. They attempted, but my sense of it is that
they did not do their political homework. What they were trying to
do was extend the notion beyond military security to economic se-
curity, to social justice security, and to technological security. Those
were the notions, and those four notions became the cornerpiece of
thinking about the future of the U.N., and I would add the global
polity. When I think of security, then, that is the way I think about
it. That is to say I think of a global security arrangement in which
we are thinking of, again I want to make clear, not the states of
the world, but the people. Think about the future, the year 2016,
twenty-five years from now. The threat of thermonuclear holocaust
seems to have left this room. If you had been there 10 years ago
you would have had no nukes, now we are nuking them in Iraq.
Somehow that seems to have disappeared from the rhetoric and the
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conversation of what we are about. Nevertheless, comprehensive se-
curity has to take into account that there are nuclear armaments,
there are other weapons of mass destruction. It has to take into
account that there are people below the poverty line, that every ten
seconds another child under the age of 15 dies from lack of nutrition,
starvation, disease. It has to take into account social justice so that
when the Kampucheans are engaged in the kind of behavior they are
engaged in, the U.N. or the international community has to intervene.
And when you have a kind of ecological degradation that falls below
the level of a minimal standard, then I believe the U.N. ought to
jump in. It is in that forum that I now want to go to the notion of
what kind of peacekeeping forces or police forces we should create.
I believe that if we are looking at the year 2016, it is necessary
to begin to promote the notion of a transnational police force. David
Scheffer and Louis Sohn talked last night about a world in the
foreseeable future that is completely armed and in which states con-
tinue to have unilateral military structures. Now I just want you to
know, a book called "World Peace to World Law" remains the most
authoritative statement of a world without war. It gives a sense of
how it is possible to put into place a complete and general disar-
mament, a global police force, compulsory jurisdiction before a court,
economic development programs, a legislature that handles the war
prevention issue-it is extraordinary. Louis Sohn almost 35 years
after the publication of that, writes a document which assumed that
the world is still armed and that you need 50,000 forces from each
of the Big 5 plus another 50,000. Now he may be becoming a realist.
I mean he was the radical when I first met him, he was the visionary,
but to set our sites that way, I think, denigrates the capacity of the
human race for change.
If three years ago somebody had told you that the Warsaw Pact
would be disolved by the end of March, that the Eastern European
states would no longer be part of the Russian hegemony, that three
Balkan States might be getting out of the Soviet Union, etc., people
would have thought you were just nonsensical and that you had no
sense of reality of life. Now I honestly believe in this moment in
history that there are people throughout the world who are prepared
to engage in a movement for a standing police force. I would give
to you the establishment of a 10,000 person police force, individually
recruited, located in three or four different places of the globe, which
would be at the beck and call of different voting arrangements within
the Security Council and the General Assembly. I actually would
start with the notion that when you want unarmed troops or an
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observer the Secretary General might just say, "okay, you are going
to go, you 15 people, tell them I have sent you." I am willing to
think that it is possible to change the unanimity vote of the Security
Council in the next decade. I am willing to believe and dare that
there is a way of changing the composition of the Security Council
in changing the voting arrangements. Well, those constitutional ar-
rangements should be looked at and I believe that we could begin
with the kind of individual recruitment, training, and policing that
I talked about.
I want to end on a kind of mythic note. A myth is the story of
events that unfolds a world view of people, their origin, their destiny,
their practice, and their beliefs. And what I wish to argue now is
that we have come to a moment of history when the myth that we
are discussing is the myth of human society. I realize that we still,
many of us, believe that we are in the Tower of Babel, that we still
live among all these differentiated peoples, territorially and culturally
held. Believe me I know that these are matters which you cannot
take lightly, but let me just read to you two pieces.
This piece that I am about to read to you, was written on December
10, 1941. It was three days after Pearl Harbor. It was written by a
man called E.B. White, one of the great essayists of our time. I read
to you:
"The passionate love of Americans for their America will have a
lot to do with winning this war. It is an odd thing, though, that the
very patriotism on which we now rely is the thing that must eventually
be, in part, relinquished if the world is ever to find a lasting peace
and an end to these butcherings. To hold America in one spot is
like holding a love letter in one's hand. It has so special a meaning.
Since I started writing this column, snow has begun falling again. I
sit in my room watching the reenactment of this stagy old phenomenon
outside the window. For this picture, for this privilege, this cameo
of New England with snow falling, I would give everything. If all
the time I know that this very loyalty, this feeling of being part of
a special place, this respect for one's native scene, I know that such
emotions have a big part in the world's wars. Who is there big enough
to love the whole planet? We must find such people for the next
society."
Now I could end with that because it is a lovely ending. But let
me give you one more.
"We are citizens of the world. We demand that our borders be
opened. We want commercial and cultural exchange, the right to
export our labor force abroad. We want the freedom to leave China
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in order to study on a semi-study, semi-work basis. We demand to
be able to travel freely and to take care of our prerequisites."
Manifesto of Alliance for Human Rights in China January 1, 1979.
Nine members signed it; two of them are back in jail, two of them
are still wandering around, and I do not know where the other five
are. But I end on this note, that we are citizens of the world.
PROFESSOR Sol-: Thank you. Now the time has arrived for another
view from the other super power. Our next speaker is Sergie Nikolai
Urich Smirnoff, a diplomat of old standing, in fact I would have to
admit, 40 years. He started at the Moscow Institute of International
Relations, then joined the diplomatic service, served in Warsaw,
Poland, then New Zealand. He then returned to Moscow, and he
must have done very well, because then he was sent to the United
Nations where he has stayed by now almost 20 years. He is at present
Extraordinary Deputy Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union
to the United Nations with special assignment to the Security Council.
And therefore we are going to hear from the person who has been
there now for almost 20 years.
The Door to a New Peaceful World
AMBASSADOR SmmNoFF: Thank you very much Professor. It is a
great pleasure, first for me to be here and to listen to all that was
said by the previous speakers. I am basking in the rays of the wisdom
of the speakers, and I feel very uncomfortable despite my experience
here at the United Nations.
These scholars and the professors of law look at the activities of
the Security Council of the United Nations as a whole, I should say
from a distance, from a perspective, and so their views and their
assessments and their conclusions actually are more, I should say,
of a general nature; more well-thought. They go far beyond the
horizons the diplomats can allow themselves in their practical work.
I will give you an example of how diplomats are sometimes confused
in the Security Council. For many days some diplomats, some mem-
bers of the Council, requested that Iraq would accept and promise
to comply with all the Security Council resolutions, all twelve, it was
stressed all the time. And when the letter of Tariq Aziz was brought
to the Security Council there was amazement on the part of some
of the members of the Council that Iraq accepted all the resolutions.
There were some doubts expressed that it is not what they wanted,
that it is not all but all relevant resolutions, and so they requested
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the President to go back to the Iraqi Ambassador and ask him to
add the word "all relevant resolutions." And after the President
explained that it was those diplomats who requested him to go and
ask Iraqis to consent on the acceptance to all resolutions, that is
what they did. So it was what the President said, and only after this
was misunderstanding or confusion cleared. I want to stress that
working in the Security Council we are mostly involved in the practical
day-to-day life with these resolutions, working hard on the wording,
and sometimes we are not satisfied with the wording because it is a
compromise always or by majority, but anyway it is done by many
players and so the resolutions are not perfect.
Now coming back to the discussion we have had these two days.
What was missed in my view in this debate-reference was made and
stress was made on the sanctions, to the use of force, but political
efforts, efforts to find peaceful solution of this conflict were put
aside and almost ignored except by Ambassador Galal when he was
talking about the regional efforts. I should stress that the Security
Council to the very last moment stressed the necessity of a political,
peaceful solution to the conflict. In the resolutions adopted by the
Security Council there was on 29 October, a month before Resolution
678, a specific request to the Secretary General for good offices in
this respect. All states were called upon in the region and others, to
pursue, on the basis of the Security Council resolutions, their efforts
to restore peace, security, and stability.
In responding to these requests or these appeals of the Security
Council, the Soviet Union did its best, together with the other leaders
of the non-aligned movement, leaders of the Arab states, the Or-
ganization of Islamic Countries, and others to persuade the Iraqi
leaders, to show that they had to comply with the resolutions of the
Security Council and withdraw unconditionally and as quickly as
possible. I would like to remind you that the Secretary General
appealed to the Iraqi leadership the day before the bombing started,
January 15, to withdraw from Kuwait and he promised there would
be a ceasefire or no hostilities and their forces which were brought
to the region would be withdrawn as soon as possible.
So these political efforts are very important to understand the
whole situation in which the Security Council was working. It was
not only sanctions, not only preparations of the State to use force,
although these words were never mentioned as "aggression" or some-
thing like this, it was only "invasion" as they called it in the first
Resolution 660.
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So my country, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
leadership of the country, did their best to persuade the Iraqis to
comply with the will of the international community and withdraw.
It is of course regretful that our appeals were ignored, but even after
the military operations started, the Soviet Union continued to try
hard to bring a peaceful settlement. Finally Iraq agreed to accept
the resolutions and to comply with all of them; relevant or irrelevant,
they agreed to all of them. So this is very important and I wanted
to bring to your attention these efforts of my country.
Before talking about the prospects for the future, long-term or
short-term prospects, I would like to share with you some conclusions
or assessments, my personal assessments, of what and how the Se-
curity Council was doing its job.
First I would like to draw to your attention that the Security
Council failed to use the possibilities of the Charter and especially
failed to adopt preventive measures. As Ambassador Galal was ad-
vising you, it was well-known that something is going on in this part
of the world, that there are differences or a dispute between the two
countries, and the Iraqis were preparing to, maybe not to use force,
but preparing some actions against Kuwait. And maybe, using the
possibility of the Charter, I presume the Security Council could
possibly give a strong warning to the Iraqi leadership. Maybe it would
not be enough, but this strong warning could be helpful and could
show the Security Council was ready to act from the very beginning
in a preventive manner.
This brings me to the future. I presume that the Security Council
and the Secretary General now does not have the possibility to get
impartial information on the development in different areas of the
globe so as to warn the U.N. as a whole, and the Security Council
especially, well in advance so that measures can be taken. For these
purposes, to make the Security Council act well in advance, of course
it would be necessary to take some steps to create centers for collecting
this information, maybe one international center and then maybe
some regional centers under the auspices of the United Nations, 'of
course, in different areas. This will be very important for the Security
Council and for the United Nations to prevent aggravation of a
dispute or a situation or especially an armed conflict when the meas-
ures to put it down are more difficult and more risky.
Now the second point which I want to draw your attention was
already mentioned, about this Military Staff Committee. I remember
we brought the idea of reviving a Military Staff Committee during
the Iran-Iraq war when we worked together within the five on putting
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an end to this conflict. It was in the winter of 1987. That was the
first experience of the work of the five, and it finally proved suc-
cessful. At that time we brought this notion that the Military Staff
Committee should be revived and should play its role. The Charter
of the United Nations gives the mandate to use forces of the member
states which make them available to the Security Council on its call
in accordance with the special agreement. The Military Staff Com-
mittee is there first to make strategic planning and then to assist the
Security Council. It is not the task of the Military Staff Committee
to command the forces or to play any other role than that which is
in the Charter.
Of course it is a pity that up until now there were no agreements
and that is why the Soviet Union brought this proposal and expressed
its readiness to conclude such an agreement with the Security Council.
Why did we make this suggestion? We feel that if these states,
especially the permanent members, will clearly say that they are ready
to give some contingent of military force, whether it will be aviation
or ground forces, whatever, at the disposal of the Security Council
and the Council may use these forces taking the advice and assistance
of the Military Staff Committee, it would be a warning to a possible
aggressor. It will be a strong warning that the use of force will not
pay. Maybe it sounds a bit idealistic on our part, as it was with the
suggestion on the proposal of comprehensive assistance of the inter-
national peace and security, but I should say that there is a strong
conviction on our part that this kind of arrangement plus the system
of early warning at the disposal of the U.N., the Security Council,
or the Secretary General, will be very helpful to deter aggression;
not to allow any state to use force without punishment. This is
another conclusion which can be drawn from the experience of this
Gulf Crisis.
I should say that we brought this idea about activating or revising
the Military Staff Committee. The committee consists of the repre-
sentative's military contingent, for each of the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council. From a practical point of view, we may
have come to this conclusion also at the experience of the operation
of the United Nations in the media. When the Security Council made
a mistake in calculation of what force should be given for this election
in the media, it brought a very tense situation, and then the Council
had to do much more to rectify this mistake.
At the same time we feel that-and we brought this suggestion
some time ago, maybe at the same time we also discussed the Iran-
Iraq war-some naval forces should be at the disposal of the United
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Nations. At that time we suggested that the naval force would be
used in the Persian Gulf for securing the safe passage of ships but
then their tasks may be different now.
Another point to which I wanted to draw your attention, and I
presume that the lawyers now will have a klondike or bonanza to
study all these actions of the Security Council from the legal point
of view, as specialists in international law. We diplomats cannot do
this, that's for sure but you especially young and future lawyers, you
have a great possibility to study all the actions and legal repercussions
or legal possibilities which were used, misused, not used, missed, and
how it should be properly used for the course of peace and inter-
national security in the future. If we take for example Chapter 7 it
was used by the Security Council in the first Resolution 660, and
the reference was to Articles 39 and 40. Then the Security Council
jumped to Chapter 7. I was a lawyer for some time, but then I
deserted, but my understanding is that we like this chapter as a whole,
not two or three articles here or there, interpreted one way or the
other, but we like this chapter as a whole.
If we look now from Chapter 7 and the use of force in the Persian
Gulf, we can have peacekeeping operations, on which very much was
said yesterday, when the lawyers invented a new chapter for the U.N.
Charter, 6 1/2, and peacekeeping was somewhere in there. One must
compare how the peacekeeping was arranged, what body of the U.N.
made the decisions on the peacekeeping, and what is the operation
of this in Resolution 678. I feel that it has a solid basis in the U.N.
Charter under Chapter 7 and at the same time the peacekeeping
operations are somewhere in between, but I strongly am convinced
that they do not have a solid enough legal basis. That is why we
have to think about the future of peacekeeping, how it should be
continued, what will be the legal basis, and how to give a clear-cut
legal interpretation of the last operation, as it was done by the Security
Council.
I should say that Resolution 678 does not use the word "force"
or "forces," it uses "means," and that is also a very significant
thing. Another point to which I wanted to draw the attention of the
future lawyers is that all the resolutions adopted by the Security
Council on the Gulf, all twelve of them, are considered and were
adopted as binding. In my view, it is very important from the point
of view of international lawyers that it now gives end to the long
arguments of what is the decision and what is the recommendation.
The decision is whether one decides to use force, that's one of the
arguments and all the others are recommendations. But this is an
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argument which is not a very solid one, so from the legal point of
view there should be a new notion and new vision of the binding
resolutions of the Security Council which are obligatory or compulsory
to all members of the U.N. under Article 25.
It is also important from another point of view, from the practical
point of view. If the Security Council adopted Resolution 660 as
binding, and acted very decisively, very swiftly to ensure its imple-
mentation, to enforce these decisions, then from my point of view
there should be equal treatment to the other decisions of the Security
Council adopted previously or which will be adopted in the future.
I am not saying that all the time we should go into sanctions im-
mediately and then we have to adopt the decisions of all other means
to be used, but the legal, so to say, efforts of the Security Council
to reinforce the fulfillment of its own decisions should be repeated
in the future for different kinds of areas.
Now another point which I wanted to say a couple of words about
was the word "veto" which was used very often here. I should say
that I have some misgivings about this word. Of course, it is easier
to understand than this concurrent vote of the five permanent mem-
bers, but in my view it gives quite a different vision of the Security
Council. In the time of Cold War, yes it was obviously veto, one
member of the Security Council could end any resolution. But now,
and I presume it was the idea of the founding fathers, I presume
Professor Sohn will clarify this point, the idea was quite different-
not to give the power to kill a resolution or a decision or a proposal
to a member of these permanent members of the Security Council,
but to ask them to consult, to have debate, consultations, meetings,
just to find a generally acceptable solution, and in my view that is
the way that practice goes now. It started step-by-step in 1987 when
on the working level the five permanent members started to find a
solution to the Iran-Iraq war and finally managed to prepare the
famous, well-known Resolution 598 which contains the comprehensive
plan of settlement of the crisis. Regretfully the meaning of the words
was immediately interpreted as one year, and implementation without
delay as three years, but that is a different interpretation and a
different story.
I feel that we should at least for ourselves understand the difference
between the veto powers and the necessity to have an agreement
between the five, because the latter forces or requests the permanent
members to consult and strive for a common position in the interest
of effective work of the Security Council.
1992]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
It was mentioned that the activities of the Council now opens the
way for enforcement of international law. I am not a lawyer now
anymore, but I humbly disagree with this. The Council did not give
power to enforce international law by using bombs or using ground
forces or by-let's put it as it was in the resolution-by all other
means. The Council was talking about enforcing its own decisions.
This is in strict accordance with the provisions of the Charter to give
effect to the decisions of the Security Council. Enforcement of the
law of international law in my view can be done only through law,
not in other ways.
Maybe I did not quite understand what was said, but there was a
very grave statement that the time to be intimidated by the U.N.
Charter is over. I do not know, maybe I am wrong and maybe I
misunderstood, but I would say that in my view it is time now to
use the Charter, to use the possibilities of the Charter, to use the
new international situation which made it possible for the United
Nations to work in such a manner that the law can be enforced
through the legal means, through the means which are at the disposal
of the United Nations, not at the disposal of the individual states,
but from the decisions of the Security Council and in strict accordance
with the Charter. That is the only way force can be used. If Article
51 was mentioned, the right to individual or collective self-defense,
we should not forget the Article says until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Article 51 gives the right of course to defend when there is a direct
attack on a state, individually or collectively, but not until the Council
acts and we hope the Council will act in the future as quickly as
efficiently as it did in the case of the Gulf crisis.
Very much was said about the narrow issue of long-term measures
which should be taken to settle the situation in the Persian Gulf and
long-term prospects of establishing a regional security system. In this
area there were different approaches about the role of the regional
states and regional organizations. Of course, they have their primary
responsibilities and it is for them to decide this kind of stuff, but
of course the U.N. as a whole and the Security Council, of course,
will be involved since they have been involved since the 2nd of August.
They will play their roles not only in finalizing the war, but the
measures the Council has taken against the act of invasion or the
invasion should give a solid, legal political basis for the future of
this area as a stable and peaceful future.
I cannot risk to go as far as the speaker which preceded me about
the more general vision of the world of tomorrow, but I feel that
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he was right, of course, saying that we cannot and should not proceed
from what we have today. We have today no military organization
of the Warsaw Pact, not the Pact as a whole, but only military
organization at this juncture. We should remember other changes
which have taken place in Europe, the United Germany, all other
changes in the international arena and even within the United Nations,
which enhance the possibility of the organization and which give new
possibilities for settling not only the problems of international peace
and security, but many other problems of an economic nature, hu-
manitarian, social, environmental. If we take the most difficult prob-
lem, the problem of disarmament which was also mentioned, we have
the first solid steps which have been taken on a bilateral basis between
the two countries, the Soviet Union and the United States, as well
as the agreements which are being shaped in Europe. So this creates,
opens the door to, a new peaceful world, I should say.
Let me finish on this note. Thank you.
Concluding Remarks
PROFESSOR SOIN: Thank you very much for bringing us back to
where we should have been though we have flown into many directions
during our discussions of the last two days. And what of course is
encouraging about what we have heard several times over the last
two days is the fact that as was said just a minute ago by Mr.
Smirnoff, new vistas have opened to us.
It will be a great shame if we do not make progress towards a
better future. You can always go backwards and make it worse, but
here is a great chance to go forward and make it better.
Professor Mendlovitz has kind of complained that maybe I deserted
my younger days, and that I am proposing different things now. Far
from it. The goals of mine, the goals that this man has told us about
the Soviet Union doing, the proposals presented to the United Nations
over the last few years, that the developing countries met at The
Hague last year and made various proposals, all these things are
going in one direction. Namely many nations want to at this point
by the end of this century, by the magic year of 1999-because it is
also 100 years from the Hague Peace Conference-we all would like,
really by that year, to have peace in the world and to make everything
possible to have such peace and we have started on it.
People forget, the papers did not even report it, that on February
8 when everyone was watching the horrible things that were happening
in the Middle East, a conference ended in Malta of the thirty-four
countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
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the CSCE, including the European countries plus the United States
and Canada. They reached an agreement unanimously on improving
the means for settling disputes, including establishing, for the first
time as far as CSCE is concerned, a new mechanism to assist states
in settling disputes. This was never mentioned. Is this is not as
important as a few bombs?
And I think this, we have to change our values. That peace is
more important than war. That people should try every step they
take to go in the direction of peace. And we have many important
people here. Some of them have spent most of their lives trying to
find a way to peace. And I think that is what everybody here should
leave this place saying to himself or herself, my duty also is to do
what I can for bringing peace to the world. Because without peace
we don't have all those other things. War is negation of everything
that is dear to mankind. And that I agree, certainly, is so. But
everybody realizes that it is difficult and has to be done step by step.
Grenville Clark always was saying, "Yes people say we should take
a big leap forward, but if you had a precipice in front of you and
you make the leap forward, you land at the bottom of the precipice.
And you will need a very great leap to be able to get to the other
side of the dangerous place. And if there is a way you can go down
one way and up the other way it may be much safer." And I think
that is what we have been doing.
I do not think it is time now to start another discussion. Therefore,
I think I would like, unless my co-chairman objects, to say that we
have had two days of great debate. We have heard statements putting
light on quite a number of problems which we have been thinking
a little about but did not really realize their implications, the variety
of meanings of various statements and phrases, and the fact that
yes, over the last two months, we have done something very important
for the future of humanity. Namely we have restored some faith,
maybe not complete faith, but some faith in the importance of the
United Nations, in its usefulness and in the fact that perhaps from
now on we are going to pay much more attention to it. And maybe
some day we will even pay much more attention to the fact that in
many other periods the United Nations has made great accomplish-
ments over the last 40 years, and that they are as important perhaps
as some accomplishments we are making in the military field.
Whether we are going to have this kind of force, or that kind of
force, the future is going to decide. And it seems to me that what
Ambassador Smirnoff has said is very clear, that the Soviet Union
is now banking very much on improving the military situation of the
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United Nations and thinking about signing some of those agreements
that they started making in 1946 and never did, about bringing new
life to the Military Staff Committee. We know that we have accom-
plished quite a lot of disarmament and we have just put a few dots
over the i's and crossed a few t's and we are about ready to finish;
but we always almost get to the point and then someone says, in
Article 27 there is a phrase I do not understand, and the whole
business has to wait for another few weeks or months to solve this
new problem.
It reminds me of what happened to us when we were drafting the
Test Ban Treaty. Ambassador Harriman went to Moscow to do it,
and got it almost done and was about to make the final speech, but
suddenly his Deputy ran to him and said there was a new telegram
from the Pentagon. They would like to make one change. The draft
says "under water" in two words in the title of the treaty, but says
"underwater" one word in the text and they want a clarification
further we meant "under water" or "underwater." Harriman simply
took his hearing aid out of his ear and said to him, "I cannot hear
what you are saying," and proceeded to sign the treaty and then let
them worry later about whether there was an important difference
between those two words.
I think this is the kind of trivial objections that occur very often
when we are working on important things, and they are completely
unnecessary. Therefore I hope that what you have learned here is
that we have made important progress over the last 45 years and I
hope that we do not have to wait another 45 years to make even
more progress.
THE END
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